

**Course:** Master Project (PM 12)

**Lecturer:** Prof. Dr. Eva Heidbreder

**Date:** May 09, 2022

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# MASTER PROJECT

## EXAMINING THE INTERSECTION BETWEEN CLIMATE AND SOCIAL POLICY: AN ANALYSIS OF THE WELL-BEING DIMENSIONS OF THE GREEN TRANSITION ANCHORED IN THE NEXTGENERATIONEU

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20.178 words

**Submitted by:**

Ana Lopes Carneiro – 230067, [ana.lopes@ovgu.de](mailto:ana.lopes@ovgu.de);

Florian Adam – 228970, [florian.adam@st.ovgu.de](mailto:florian.adam@st.ovgu.de);

Sarah Schmitt – 228971, [sarah.schmitt@ovgu.de](mailto:sarah.schmitt@ovgu.de)

## Abstract

In response to the coronavirus pandemic, the European Union (EU) has enacted the ‘biggest stimulus package ever’: the *NextGenerationEU* recovery instrument, surpassing EUR 800 billion. The instrument is dedicated to building a better EU emerging stronger from the pandemic – greener, more digital, and more resilient. Its centrepiece is the *Recovery and Resilience Facility* (RRF), which provides grants and loans to support reforms and investments in the Member States. However, the Member States need to fulfil requirements in order to obtain funding. A relevant part of the agreement is the dedication of a minimum of 37% of the expenditure in climate reforms and thus relating investments in the respective *National Recovery and Resilience Plans* (NRRPs) of the Member States.

This paper aims to comprehend how investing in the green transition can directly and/or indirectly affect social problems positively and simultaneously whether the intersection between social and environmental policy is conveyed clearly in the national plans. To observe a potential synergy of social and climate goals, the NRRPs of Austria, France, Germany, and Portugal have been scrutinized and subjected to a content analysis informed by an exploration of what is found at the intersection of social and environmental policy: an approach centred in well-being. In the *OECD Better Life Index*, we found a comprehensive set of well-being indicators, which was adapted to fit our research design.

With our analysis, we demonstrated that all four Member States’ plans promote well-being mostly through the creation of ‘New, green jobs’ and improvement of ‘Air quality’ and ‘Public Health’. Additionally, and more surprisingly, our analysis proved that the national governments’ plans for a green transition demonstrate potential to promote ‘Social equity’. Nonetheless, the four Member States conveyed more consistently their advancements in the ‘Jobs’ dimension and did not place great emphasis in tracing the environment-health nexus in their green transition section. Lastly, the analysis supports the argument that it is possible to observe where social and environmental policy intersect by focusing on a well-being approach.

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## LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

CCPI	Climate Change Performance Index
DARP	Deutscher Aufbau- und Resilienzplan
e.g.	exempli gratia
et al.	et alii
EU	European Union
GDP	Gross domestic product
i.e.	id est
JTF	Just Transition Funds
MDGs	Millennium Development Goals
MFR	Multiannual Financial Framework
NGEU	NextGenerationEU
NRRP	National Recovery and Resilience Plan
ÖAR	Österreichischer Aufbau- und Resilienzplan 2020-2026
OECD	Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
PNNR	Plan National de Relance et de Résilience
PRR	Plano de Recuperação e Resiliência
RRF	Recovery and Resilience Facility
SDGs	Sustainable Development Goals
SWB	Subjective well-being
WBD	Well-being dimensions

## 1. Introduction

The EU is faced with unprecedented challenges: a climate emergency requiring an immediate and well-coordinated response and a pandemic which is affecting our societies and economies, showing no signs of its impacts disappearing completely in the near future. As the coronavirus crisis hits Europe and the world in 2020, the Commission provides the largest stimulus package which has ever been initiated. This political response to the pandemic entails a temporary fund adjacent to the EU's long-term budget: the *NextGenerationEU*.

“NextGenerationEU is more than a recovery plan – it is a once in a lifetime chance to emerge stronger from the pandemic, transform our economies and societies, and design a Europe that works for everyone” (European Commission, n.d.a). On the one hand, it follows from the Commission's statement that this temporary instrument was launched, first and foremost, to boost the recovery of the economy after its downturn resulting from the coronavirus pandemic. On the other hand, and this is what makes the largest EU stimulus package ever financed unique, it is used to advance and accelerate changes in key areas of the long-term EU policy agenda. In other words, the NextGenerationEU (NGEU) recovery instrument is intended to restore the EU economy to its old strength and simultaneously transform European economies and societies to a greener, more digital and more resilient world region that is excellently positioned for future challenges.

The ‘largest stimulus package ever’ has an overall volume of EUR 806,9 billion, borrowed from the capital markets by the European Commission. The main component and thus the centrepiece is formed by the RFF. Precisely EUR 723,8 billion (in current prices) are bundled here, of which grants account for EUR 338 billion and loans for EUR 385,8 billion. The financial support is intended for reforms and investments undertaken by the Member States in the economic and social sector to combat the impact of the coronavirus pandemic. The investments and reforms on the national level should in particular promote the green and digital transitions, two of the key priorities of the long-term EU policy agenda cemented within the *Multiannual Financial Framework* (MFR). The RFF entered into force on February 19, 2021, to finance the undertakings of EU countries from the start of the coronavirus pandemic in February 2021 until December 31, 2026. Furthermore, NGEU will also bring around EUR 85 billion additional money to other European programmes or funds such as *ReactEU*, *Horizon Europe*, *InvestEU*, *Rural Development*, *Just Transition Funds* (JTF) or *RescEU* (European Commission, n.d.b).

To benefit from the support of the RFF, Member States have to submit their NRRPs to the Commission. Each NRRP includes a precise overview of the reforms and investments to be implemented until the end of the year 2026. The Commission assesses the national plans especially against the targets of 37% of expenditure for climate investments and 20% of expenditure to foster the digital transition. Besides, each NRRP should effectively take up the challenges identified in the European Semester, in particular the country-specific recommendations of 2019 and 2020 adopted by the Council (European Commission, n.d.c).

The RRF is ascribed overarching goals of mitigating the social and economic ramifications of the COVID-19 pandemic, whilst supporting European societies to be more sustainable and resilient, thus ready to embark on green and digital transitions. The conditionality attributed to the RRF signals to some “an ideal chance to create a more social and sustainable Europe” (Radtke, 2021) and objectively supports simultaneously the tackling of social and environmental concerns. Other instruments suggest a synergy and/or conciliation between climate policy and social policy goals, such as the *Just Transition Mechanism* or *Just Transition Fund*. Moreover, there is a constancy in a discourse assuring Europe’s population that climate mitigation and adaptation measurements are not to be detrimental for European societies, i.e., the new *European Green Deal* is “leaving no one-behind”, the green transition will be a just one. Indeed, and particularly in the aftermath of COVID-19 and an impending climate crisis, the EU must attend to the “pressing need for decarbonization without exacerbating societal divisions within and between countries” (Weko, 2021, p. 16). Accordingly, at the end of 2021, a guide to a fair transition towards climate neutrality followed under the motto “[p]utting people at the heart of the green transition” (European Commission, 2021b).

Before attending to questions regarding the possibility of indeed witnessing a green and fair transition in the years to follow, one must comprehend that the discourse of the European Commission and the actions aiming at a fair transition are a response to previous events and current concerns. It responds to a lack of public support from distinct groups in and between Member States, as the issue of climate change demonstrates to offer a potential ground for further conflict between winners and losers of globalisation, as a division between the latter extends beyond previous politicised topics, such as immigration in the EU (Weko, 2021, p. 3). Such has been demonstrated by the ‘Yellow Vest’ movement, which erupted in the streets of central Paris in 2018, after the ratification of a tax increase on fuel, whose proceedings were planned to fund the French green transition. Between the Yellow Vest movement and *European Green Deal* debates arises the notion of just transition and it is further thematised the unevenness between perpetration and repercussion (Stavis et al., 2020, p. 4-5). Moreover, several fear for a loss of their jobs, when working in industries that will be made obsolete in the transition to a green economy.

Environmental concerns and social concerns are often at conflicting ends of a trade-off and often in the centre of heated debates, protests, and future worries. However, social and environmental concerns are not necessarily conflicting. These might overlap, as climate adaptation and mitigation measures might simultaneously tackle social problems or produce social benefits. A great example of this complementarity are actions in the realm of energy policy. Aiming at reducing energy consumption can combat energy poverty in private households, thus having a positive impact on the housing expenditure of citizens.

Accordingly, our research is centred on the following questions: Is the social agenda combined with the green transition investments in the selected NRRPs? Is there an intersection between climate and social policy?

To observe how a positive relation between social concerns and environmental concerns can be obtained through new reforms and investments towards a green transition requires a purposeful



attempt to discern the potential social benefits of environmental policy. We argue that social policy and environmental policy intersect and that in this intersection a positive relation between the two policy fields can be observed and accordingly, purposefully obtained. Our aim by scrutinising selected NRRPs is to comprehend how investing in the green transition can directly and/or indirectly affect social problems positively and simultaneously, whether the intersection between social and environmental policy is conveyed clearly in the national plans, or only implied. Observing whether potential benefits for societies and individuals are mentioned in connection to investments of the NRRPs green transition section, allows us to comprehend whether national governments: a) intentionally seek to advance a social agenda contiguous to actions towards climate mitigation and adaptation; b) comprehend or stand behind the importance of communicating positive potential social outcomes of environmental policy.

To fulfil the aim of the present research, our contribution provides firstly background information to contextualise our thesis and research question, namely how the EU was led to attribute a prominent role in its discourse to the intersection of climate and social issues. In the third chapter of this paper, we expound our theoretical approach: firstly, we delve into the concept of social policy, its ambiguity and transversality, thus delivering an important conceptual tool for the establishment of our theoretical framework. We describe the approach chosen for the identification and categorisation of the social dimensions of environmental policy: an approach centred on the concept of well-being, which informs our analysis of the investments for a green transition in the selected NRRPs. In the fourth chapter, we provide a detailed explanation of our methodological proceedings in a first section, introducing the criteria applied in the selection of comparator countries: Austria, France, Germany, and Portugal. In the second section, the considerations and proceedings in the phase of data collection are described. In the third section, we present the framework of our analysis and expound the bridging of an approach centred on well-being, stemming from the theoretical background of our research and the development of categories in the execution of a qualitative content analysis of the NRRPs of the four chosen Member States. The findings are thereafter exposed and discussed in the fifth chapter of this contribution. As we discuss the results of our analysis, we expound further the potentially positive intersection of social and environmental benefits. Finally, we draw a conclusion that comprises a summary of our results and findings and addresses eventual limitations of our study.

## 2. Environmental concerns, the EU and NextGenerationEU

The *concept of sustainable development*<sup>1</sup> became a guiding principle for policymaking during the 1990s, after the Rio Earth Summit in 1992, headed by the United Nations. However, only in 2001, the *concept of sustainable development* started being operationalised by the European Union and

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<sup>1</sup>Sustainable development stands for a form of development that secures the capacity of not only the current generation, but also of future generations to fulfil their needs (see United Nations. (1993). *Report of the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development*.). Since 1992, the concept stands for the necessity to balance social inclusion, safeguarding the environment and economic growth. At the intersection of these three dimensions, the “well-being of individuals and societies” is expected to be met (see United Nations (n.d.) *The Sustainable Development Agenda*, <https://www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/development-agenda-retired/>)

respective Member States (Steurer, 2021, p. 280-283). Several Member States established development strategy processes. Soon it became noticeable that sustainable development strategies were substandard for the management and integration of sectoral policies. Often, as described by Nordbeck and Steurer (2016), the three dimensions of sustainable development were monitored by attending to single indicators. The social dimension was narrowly examined according to poverty or unemployment rates, gross domestic product (GDP) growth would be the sole indicator for the economic dimension and CO<sub>2</sub> or toxic emissions would dominate the monitoring of the environmental dimension (Steurer, 2021, p. 282).

Meanwhile at the supranational level, the EU's main agenda of policymaking, the Lisbon Process, was predominantly centred on socio-economic issues and mostly detached from environmental concerns. In 2001, the European Commission had adopted a succinct and ambiguous sustainable development strategy setting rather modest goals. As the Lisbon Process – adopted in the turn of the millennium – was renewed five years later in 2005, environmental issues remained neglected. Consequently, with the challenges imposed by the financial crisis in 2008, the polity continued shelving environmental issues and the EU's sustainable development strategy waned. Additionally, although the EU's sustainable development strategy was renewed in 2006, the aftermath of the financial crisis hindered its implementation (Steurer, 2021, p. 282-283).

The situation did not change noticeably in the course of the new decade. Sustainable development has not been able to assert itself as a guiding concept across the Member States and a common EU sustainability strategy remained an unfulfilled wish of few European decision-makers. While the global sustainability agenda evolved immensely with the adoption of the *Sustainable Development Goals* (SDGs<sup>2</sup>) in 2015, this momentum could not be transferred to the European level. Although all Member States are contracting parties of the *2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development*, the demise of a common sustainable development approach remained unchanged. Merely the EU's policy rhetoric changed at that time, because the 2030 agenda came with a stronger follow-up and review framework than the previous *Millennium Development Goals* (MDGs<sup>3</sup>) one. Driven by the fear of losing its carefully built image as a worldwide leader in environmental and sustainability policies, the EU began to change its communications policy in a way of highly emphasising at any opportunity that its action aligns with the SDGs (Steurer, 2021, p. 284).

From 2008 onwards, and especially between 2010 and 2019, the EU's focus shifted from pushing forward an environmental policy integration or common sustainable development agenda to being more focused on integrating climate change mitigation into other policy domains. This approach of climate policy integration was initially known as *sustainable growth* within the framework of the EU's ten-year strategy *Europe 2020*<sup>4</sup> back in 2010. Starting from this pure climate definition of *sustainable growth*, the Commission was successful in broadening it to include other environmental issues in the

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<sup>2</sup>See United Nations (n.d.a) for details of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and the relating SDGs

<sup>3</sup>See United Nations (n.d.b) for details of the MDGs

<sup>4</sup>See European Union: European Commission, *Communication from the Commission on "Europe 2020" – A strategy for smart, sustainable and inclusive growth*, 3 March 2010, COM (2010) 2020 for details about Europe 2020 and the relating approach of sustainable growth

course of the 2010s. Particular mention should be given to the *concept of a circular economy*<sup>5</sup>, based on avoiding waste by keeping materials in use within the economic cycle as long as possible – a concept mainly promoted by the Directorate-General for Environment. Besides, biotechnology and life sciences were taken up again and further developed as important aspects for the EU's economic development. It has become a main Commission's priority to establish a *bioeconomy*<sup>6</sup> that is characterised by increasing the economic scale, efficiency and sustainability of bioeconomy sectors and pushing forward the replacement of non-renewable with renewable resources. As regards this development, however, it must be made clear that climate policy integration remained the central environmental priority of the EU. By the same token, the socio-economic priorities prevail the environmental ones in the *Europe 2020* framework (Steurer, 2021, p. 284-291).

The month of December of 2019 seems from the present point of view to be a turning point in EU policymaking because the *European Green Deal*<sup>7</sup> put the accelerating climate crisis at the heart of both public and political attention. For the first time, environmental policies broke up the dominance of the socio-economic priorities of the EU agenda. At this point, climate policy integration issues prevail on the socio-economic agenda of the Commission. In the wake of the *European Green Deal*, the concept of sustainable development and the SDGs became less important in public and political discussions and lost any aspiration to coordinate EU policies. This is because the *European Green Deal* does align with a claim to balance out the three dimensions of sustainable development, what is essentially needed to make the concept working, but catapults the environmental dimension to the top of the EU agenda. Since that time, the sustainable development agenda solely continued to play a role in the EU's communication policies (Steurer, 2021, p. 291-295).

However, despite this clearly visible shift of priorities, the Commission communicated explicitly that “[p]utting people at the heart of the green transition” (European Commission, 2021b) and thus, fairness and solidarity represent core principles of the *European Green Deal*. The Commission made it unambiguously clear that it is aware of the tremendous consequences of a changing environmental policy for people and societies in Europe. While the Commission points out the positive aspects of the green transition (e.g., new jobs and economic growth), it also clearly recognizes that “it is important to ensure that no one is left behind” (European Commission, 2021b).

This is where the NGEU recovery package comes into play. The largest EU stimulus package has a near-universal claim that “[it] is more than a recovery plan – it is a once in a lifetime chance to emerge stronger from the pandemic, transform our economies and societies, and design a Europe that works for everyone” (European Commission, n.d.a). In a context where Europe attempts a sustainable growth addressing economic, social, and environmental factors, and observing the relation of mutual influence between environmental and social policy, we argue against a narrow perspective on either policy field. With our analysis, we intend to demonstrate how these overlap, and examine whether national governments align with the discourse at the European level. Moreover, we present a set of well-being indicators, which are pluralistic and viable in informing policymaking.

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<sup>5</sup>See European Commission (n.d.d) for details of the EU's circular economy action plan

<sup>6</sup>See European Commission (n.d.e) for details of the EU's bioeconomy idea

<sup>7</sup>See European Commission (n.d.f) for details of the *European Green Deal*

### 3. Theoretical background

To identify the links between social and environmental policy in the reforms and investments aiming at a green transition, the researchers are confronted with a precursory question: how to detect the intersection of both areas of concern? How to extract from the data information on the potential social benefits of the green transition? It is evident that climate goals are the backbone of the NRRPs green transition, however we need an identification method for the presence of social goals. This requires a purposeful attempt to comprehend, first and foremost, the concept of social policy and consequently identify the scope and functions of the policy field.

In this chapter, we firstly expound the concept of social policy, focusing on its transversality and ambiguity, additionally demonstrating its inextricability from the concepts of social cohesion and general and individual well-being. Secondly, as we defend the necessity to investigate and procure the overlaps between social and environmental problems, we argue that at the centre of this intersection are concerns regarding general and individual well-being. Consequently, we introduce an approach centred on well-being, which enlightens the social benefits of investments aiming at a green transition.

#### 3.1. Social policy – ambiguity and transversality

There are three archetypal European traditions of social policy, namely, the German, British and Swedish (Kaufmann, 2013, p. V). According to the model of Esping-Andersen (1990), these align with three types of welfare-state: conservative (Germany), liberal (England) and social democratic (Sweden). Their origins stem from different historical backgrounds, a fundamental point for the understanding of how the design of welfare states and the reasoning about social policy is influenced by human and societal experience. The three models are distinct in the way and extension to which these interfere with social processes and structures. The conservative model provides a middle-sized social policy and relies greatly on systems of social insurance. As for the liberal model, it entails less socio-political state action and allows for the free market and family structures to play prominent roles (Kaufmann, 2013, p. 122). Such relates to the long tradition of utilitarianism in these societies, which is employed in the support of the argument that individuals themselves are the most capable of deciding what provides them happiness, and so the individual is provided greater freedom to meet these decisions, while governments are ascribed the role of enabling and promoting the latter, by punishing and rewarding the citizenry (Bache & Scott, 2018, p. 10). In return, the social-democratic model provides a large-sized social policy and is guided by the premise that the obtainment of social benefits, provided by the public service, constitutes a civil right (Esping-Andersen, 1990).

Although England and France were economically ahead of Germany in the middle of the 19th century, Germany arose as a forerunner in socio-political thinking (Kaufmann, 2013, p. 122). Stolleis describes concisely the constancy in German state and administrative theory which propelled Germany into its leading role:

*“The pronounced Christian understanding of office and service, the expectation toward authority that it would ensure the realization of ‘happiness’ and ‘good order,’ the penchant,*

*finally, to reform the administrative apparatus rather than overthrow the state – all this did not really change even in the age of liberalism. If we look at the history of public law, we can see, also after the transition to the nineteenth century, as well, the history of public law revealed the dominance of the administrative theorist over the state theorist, the continuation of Policywissenschaften [science of public policy] as part of legal education, and the combination – so typical for Germany – of state administration and self-governance, federal structures, and a pronounced sense of social responsibility” (Kaufmann, 2013, p. 59)*

The German concept of *Sozialpolitik* differs substantially from Anglo-American thinking about social policy. The first focused on a collectivistic and conservative perspective on social policy, while the latter focused on a liberal perspective, centred on individual welfare. Furthermore, within each context, social issues became more predominant than others. In Germany emphasis was placed on the “workers’ question”, in Great Britain the main focus was on poverty, in Scandinavia, the enthusiasm for equality was its social policy’s centrepiece and in France, the principle of solidarity acquired the most prominence. Historically, the concept of social policy evolved in line with the setting of each particular state tradition. Nowadays, as subfields of social policy proliferate into multiple areas, these subfields – health policy, youth policy, etc. - dominate the discourse and with them proliferate their separate specialised scientific foundations. This, according to Kaufmann, led to less theoretical support for the field of social policy, which respectively contributes to a current definition of social state or welfare state detached from the paradigm of social policy (Kaufmann, 2013, p. 123-124).

When reviewing literature on the subject and attempting to discern the areas of social policy, the overall aim of social policy and what constitutes social problems are made clear. Yet different sources provide different lists of areas of concern and action of the policy field (Boeck, Huster, Benz & Schütte, 2011; Frevel & Dietz, 2004). There is also no consensus in the terminology used. Some authors refer to “social problems and target groups of social policy” (Frevel & Dietz, 2004, p. 99), Boeck et al. list “areas” (2011, p. 135), Kaufmann (2013), names subfields but does not list them fully.

A lacking consensual conceptualisation and categorisation of the areas of concern and action of social policy signals the necessity of opting for one categorisation out of several found in our preliminary theoretical research. However, since opting for one out of several categorisations found in our preliminary research could arise from an arbitrary decision, in detriment of a set of methodical proceedings, we opted for another approach. According to Cahnman and Schmitt, von Zwiedineck-Südenhorst’s writings on *Sozialpolitik* offer a conceptual tool for the “integration of scientific and normative perspectives in the social sciences” (1979, p. 47). Indeed, Zwiedineck’s theorisation of social policy offers the possibility of employing the term as a conceptual tool, fundamental to the research at hand. As such, we expound the theoretician’s reasoning about social policy in an attempt to demonstrate how the concepts of *Sozialpolitik* and social welfare can be bridged and how one finds the smallest common reality that constructs the premises and key argument for our focus on indicators of well-being: Social policy aims for social cohesion; social cohesion is not separable from individual well-being; social policy aims for the well-being of individuals, as a precursory goal to attain

social cohesion. Moreover, Zwiedineck's theory supports our view on the transversality of social policy and, as such, its intersection with environmental policy.

In *Sozialpolitik* (1911), Zwiedineck defines social policy's aim as "securing the continued attainment of the ends of society" (as cited in Cahnman & Schmitt, 1979, p. 50). Social policy attempts a constant adjustment of interests which are simultaneously competing and interdependent, i.e., it strives for social cohesion. In this sense, aligned with the German tradition, social policy delivers actions seeking to influence societal conditions, processes and structures, thus being attributed an interventionist and preventive character. All threats against social cohesion are tackled by social policy, therefore demanding a moral conduct predicated on the acknowledgement of common interests and a need to cooperate not solely at the workplace but in society as a whole. Moreover, Zwiedineck contemplates society as ever-changing, meaning that a static social policy that observes the "ends of society" as stagnant is erroneous and insufficient. As it is with the "ends of society", so must social policy change and adapt (Cahnman & Schmitt, 1979, p. 50-52).

According to Zwiedineck, there are two elements in social policy. One refers to the awareness of the forces which move society and the understanding of the directions in which society develops. The second element entails the idea of social organisation which strays away from the prevailing societal order. The presence of these two elements describes a fundamental interplay of human cognition and human will in social policy. The cognitive capacity enables the ability and intent to face the world and its manifestations, making sense of the latter and to understand society's processes and respective ramifications. Consequently, being able to evaluate the cultural significance of phenomena of stratification of classes and job-related groupings in society. As for the will, it manifests in the confrontation and subsequent action countering or supporting certain observed phenomena. The basis for social policy is the direction of the "civilised man's" will (as cited in Cahnman & Schmitt, 1979, p. 53-54). The content of this will is defined by an aspiration to preserve societal unity, tied closely with the mitigation of class antagonisms. Yet, the complexity of this will cannot be summed up this easily, for the concern for the interests of the most disadvantaged strata of society is in line with the preservation of harmony in society. Whilst addressing the interests of the most underprivileged class, the interests of the middle and other disadvantaged classes must be concomitantly looked after. Otherwise, class antagonisms might be aggravated, contrary to what is intended (Cahnman & Schmitt, 1979, p. 54-56).

Another relevant characteristic expounded in Zwiedineck's conceptualisation of social policy is its countering of individualistic interests when detrimental to societal unity. Noted is on the other end, a potential synergy between social policy's goals and social goals driven by individualistic interests. The latter can thus overlap and be pursued simultaneously. Zwiedineck's conceptualisation of social policy goes beyond the German tradition and to his theory of *Sozialpolitik*, the theoretician adjoins the tenets of social welfare, a concept more established in English-speaking countries, particularly in the United States of America and the United Kingdom. As previously explained, *Sozialpolitik* seeks a constant balancing of competing and simultaneously synergic forces in society and is of a preventive, or at least planning character, tackling threats to social cohesion so as to assure it. Social welfare is, however, centred on the provision of support to individuals in need, thus focusing on the

mitigation of the ramifications of social inequalities, rather than combating threats opposing social cohesion. Zwiedineck considers the constrictions of a collectivist approach to social policy's aim and couples the latter with the individualistic approach, noting that social cohesion is unattainable, while the well-being of individuals, which constitute society, is neglected. The theoretician's thinking on social policy culminates in defining social policy's intent as a fight against circumstances of individual deprivation and suffering and for that seeks to better the legal and material position of the underprivileged strata of society. Zwiedineck's standpoint cuts across the conservative vs. liberal antagonism by unifying the two approaches and opposing the notion that these are contradictory (Cahnman & Schmitt, 1979, p. 50-59).

Lastly, Zwiedineck's thinking on social policy informs the possibility of perceiving the latter not as one field, but rather a direction of political action, as the theoretician expounds:

*“even acts of legislation concerning a subject-matter which appears to be remote from social problems nevertheless offer opportunities for social-political consideration if the object of the legislation touches in one way or another upon the area of conflict”* (as cited in Cahnman & Schmitt, 1979, p. 58).

Zwiedineck's thinking on social policy offers our contribution valuable notions gathered in one conceptual tool. We chose accordingly to focus on indicators of individual well-being, for social policy attends to the latter, by attempting to improve the conditions of entire strata of society. Moreover, Zwiedineck's proposal of observing social policy as a direction and adapting to respond to new challenges, threats, and changes in an ever-changing society, resonates with our aim of examining the intersections of social policy and environmental policy.

Although there is a formally established policy field designated as social policy, social problems are not tackled from one singular “policy corner” (Wallimann, 2013, p. 1). Likewise, environmental problems are not exclusively problems in the realm of environmentalism. As such, these have economic and social dimensions and are not neatly severed from other policy fields. Furthermore, as articulated by von Zwiedineck (1911), social policy demands the cognitive capacity of facing the world and its manifestations and attribute meaning to the latter. Accordingly, social policy is expected to respond to the current challenges imposed by the necessity of sustainable resource usage and by climate change and its respective repercussions. The transversality of social policy and intersection of environmental and social problems is not to be overlooked, as is the relation of mutual relevance between the two policy fields.

### **3.2. An approach centred in well-being**

In the previous chapter, we delivered a conceptualisation of social policy, tied with its purpose of striving for social cohesion and preventing and alleviating individual hurdles. Adjoining our connection between social policy and well-being, we explore arguments supportive to an interventive role of government, to the value of well-being and an approach that is pragmatic and pluralist, allowing for the establishment of well-being dimensions.

Since COVID-19 has started affecting our lives and restricting our social interactions, two crucial realisations have shaped our collective thinking. Firstly, the notion that aside from cultural relativism, human well-being, predominantly human health is a value common to all societies and also aside from differences between societies' political systems, the latter demonstrated the ability to prioritise human well-being over economic growth. As for the second realisation, we were all surprised to learn how human prosperity, our lifestyles and commodities are volatile when confronted with a crisis of global proportions, as it was with the Coronavirus pandemic, as it is pending with climate change – both prompted by an insatiable pursuit of economic prosperity (Laurent, 2021, p. 1). In the two aforementioned realisations combined, the authors of *The Well-Being Transition* see the potential for a third realisation: “human commodities should better connect human well-being to resilience and sustainability via new ways to assess prosperity and bring those new visions to life by integrating them into policies” (Laurent, 2021, p. 1-2). Moreover, the authors reason with the inadequacy of indicators and principles such as GDP and economic growth, respectively, which substantially influence policies and consequently our realities (Laurent, 2021, p. 2). The context of their proposition is crucial for our research. The book has been written in the aftermath of the eruption of Coronavirus and considers the ramifications that the pandemic has for today's societies.

Already prior to the Coronavirus pandemic, Bache and Scott (2018) have identified increased attention for the concept of well-being, correlated with the aftermath of the financial crisis. With their contribution, Bache and Scott intend to fill in a gap left by the politics discipline, reluctant about bringing well-being into policy (p. 1-2). In truth, debates on well-being and attempts to measure it have been around for centuries and the frustration with the usage of GDP as an indicator of human prosperity since the 1960s. In this decade, well-being deserved great attention, which brought about a quest for an objective determination of quality of life and a consequent conception of instruments to assess it (Bache & Scott, 2018, p. 3). Well-being, its role in policy and devising instruments to measure it have been a topic long before the Coronavirus pandemic. Accordingly, from a prolific and multidisciplinary body of literature regarding well-being, we found an approach suitable to our research question and attending to the differing perspectives on well-being.

Taylor (2018) attempts to construct a concept of well-being, which can be pluralistic and useful for public policy. In our approach, as in Taylor's thinking, we define well-being as “a state in which a person's life is going well” (p. 74). As for the value of well-being, we argue that although often not pursuing well-being in general or its constituents, the majority of people are concerned about their individual well-being and the well-being of those they care about and/or for. As the components of well-being and the value ascribed to these and to well-being in general, these are specific to individuals. We do not argue that well-being stands above other values, such as solidarity and environmental concerns. We argue, however, that it is generally held as positive by the majority of people and directly or indirectly it matters to them (Taylor, 2018, p. 75). Having determined this, we ascribe governments the role of acting in the interests of the people, safeguarding, and promoting the latter. This entails respecting and promoting well-being. To respect well-being entails taking into account whether decisions or policies affect the well-being of a large number of individuals negatively and prevent said effect. As for when the impact on well-being cannot be clearly predicted, well-being



must still be regarded and potential negative impacts considered. Secondly, the government should promote wellbeing, i.e., strive for courses of action which can positively impact the well-being of their citizens. Often claims of freedom of choice object to the promotion of well-being by governments, i.e., individuals should be allowed to pursue well-being as established by their own parameters, and also choose against their own well-being. Nonetheless, promoting well-being, does not have to entail an invasive and/or mandatory set of policies, trapping individuals and removing their freedom of choice. Moreover, governments are not able to devise policies according to each individual's set of constituents of well-being, nor do governments legislate singularly attending to interests, values or goals valued equally by all individuals in society. Consequently, running the risk of being unfair towards those who do not value their own well-being, as it is relevant for the majority of the population, it is the role of the government to not purposely harm citizens' well-being (respecting), and take actions to increase citizens well-being (promoting) (Taylor, 2018, p. 75-77). Additionally, as expounded in the previous chapter of this contribution, social policy's purpose is to strive for social cohesion, whilst ensuring individual well-being, so as to reach social well-being, and, thus, combat class antagonisms. Often private actors, such as non-governmental organisations and donors do relevant social work and it is not exclusively in the hands of governments to design and implement social policy. Nonetheless, the role of government is irrevocable.

The following concern is: how should governments promote well-being? The roots of the current debate on well-being stem from disputes in ancient ethical theory. Classical ethics theoreticians considered *eudaimonia* ('happiness' or 'the good life') to be the "highest good or ultimate goal in life" (Bache & Scott, 2018, p. 9). In this aspect, different classical schools of thought were in agreement, however discorded on theories on how to achieve *eudaimonia*. This disagreement arose from the relation between *eudaimonia* and *arête* ('virtue', meaning excellence and employed in the description of skills, good habits, obtaining practical knowledge). Aristotelians defended that 'the good life' is attainable through the development of personality and intellectual qualities. For Epicureans, the furthering of skills and knowledge aimed at evading pain and pursuing pleasure were required to attain 'the good life'. Stoics believed that the most crucial virtue to achieving 'the good life' was a resilience to life's instabilities and developing this resilience alone would suffice (Bache & Scott, 2018, p. 9). More recently, theories supporting an 'objective list' as a diversified set of goods contributing to well-being (Finnis, 2011) as well as the Capabilities Approach, which considers how individuals' choices might be restrained by economic, cultural, social, and political circumstances (Bache & Scott, 2018, p. 12). As briefly elucidated, there are different theories regarding the concept of well-being. The ones mentioned encompass only widely recognised theories. Beyond these differences, one finds, moreover, distinct possibilities to measure well-being. Taylor (2018) provides a theory-neutral approach, obliterating the apparent obstacle of discordance regarding the conceptualisation and operationalisation of well-being. The author emphasises the commonalities between the different theories, allowing for a more broader comprehension of well-being indicators: constitutive, i.e., the ingredients, the elements that make up well-being and; productive, i.e., what can generate more well-being. Furthermore, governments should observe both sets of indicators and promote the two. Lastly, Taylor mentions elements which are indicative of well-being, i.e., what elements demonstrate that individuals are living well. These should be used, when measuring the

achievement of well-being. All three sets of elements – *constitutive*, *productive*, and *indicative* of well-being – are relevant for policy and should be accounted for in the actions and decision-making of governments. Regarding the three sets – all definitely coupled with well-being, simply varying in relationship type with the latter – these can generate more consensus than the ongoing debate on what constitutes well-being (Taylor, 2018, p. 85-89).

Often theories disagree on the type of relationship between a marker and well-being, whilst all defend the relevance of the same markers (Taylor, 2018, p. 87-88). Following this rationale and attending to the markers of well-established theories, Taylor proposes attending to the following elements, when intending to identify indicators or ‘markers’ of well-being: “a) at least partly constitutive of well-being; b) reliably productive of well-being or c) reliably indicative of well-being” (Taylor, 2018, p. 87). Considering the mentioned elements includes all factoring in physical health, entailing absence of disease and injury, sufficient nutrition, and psychological health. Moreover, happiness or subjective well-being (SWB), i.e., an individual’s positive emotional state and or substantial satisfaction with his/her life (Taylor, 2018, p. 88). Although we agree with the relevance of SWB as an indicator of well-being, this marker cannot be included in our research. To measure SWB one needs to inquire individuals about their levels of happiness. Also, it is not conceivable to measure this in relation to the analysis of the investments of the selected NRRPs. Nonetheless, alongside health indicators, one finds several more dimensions of well-being in line with empirical literature on the topic and operational for the research at hand.

There is certainly a lack of agreement on how well-being should be measured and often single indicators fall short of measuring and monitoring: a) the living conditions of individuals; b) the promotion of well-being by policies or decisions of governments. A broad list of markers constitutes a sound practical solution, accounting for different aspects factoring in an individual’s well-being and drawing from commonalities between different theories on the subject-matter (Taylor, 2018, p. 88). Since 2011, the Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD), prominent for devising evidence-based international standards and supporting governments with policymaking, has developed a set of indicators, which make the guiding principle of well-being operational. These fit as well with the parameters given by Taylor (2018), namely “aspects of physical health”, “success in realising one’s central goals/values, supportive personal relationships, personal development, leisure, adequate income/resources and rewarding employment” (p. 88). As expounded in chapter two of this contribution, indicators employed in line with guiding principles, such as the different flanks of sustainable development – economic, social, environmental –, were inadequate and at times aroused discontentment. The well-being indicators were OECD’s response to the public’s dissatisfaction (OECD, n.d.a) with the GDPs use as an indicator of economic growth. OECD’s list accounts for subjective well-being and objective well-being. A suitable set for survey-based research directed at distinct population groups and attempting to disclose the current life quality in a country (OECD, n.d.a). In our research, we account solely for objective well-being, as we attempt to disclose the explicit or implicit promotion of well-being by governments.

The objective indicators of OECD’s list are: housing, jobs, education, civic engagement, work-life balance, income, community, environment, health and safety. Within each indicator, there are sub-

indicators. For example, under housing, one finds two sub-indicators: *Housing expenditure* and *Rooms per person and dwellings with basic facilities* (OECD, n.d.b). The second sub-indicator could not possibly be employed in our analysis. Notwithstanding, beyond attending to the names of indicators, we peruse OECD's formulation, i.e., background and rationale behind each sub-indicator. In the case of *Rooms per person and dwelling with basic facilities*, OECD mentions that "[l]iving in satisfactory housing conditions is one of the most important aspects of people's lives" (OECD, n.d.b). As such, rather than considering only access to an indoor flushing toilet as a basic facility, in line with proof from previous empirical studies, we argue that other aspects, such as a well-isolated home, where people are protected from extreme temperatures and humidity constitutes an important factor for their physical and mental health.<sup>8</sup> With each sub-indicator that has been adapted in order to be operational for our research, we offer an objective connection with OECD's well-being indicators and additional substantial empirical background to support our claim.

We added moreover dimensions, for which there is significant empirical proof of maintaining a relation with well-being and which have a role in promoting at least one of the parameters named by Taylor (2018), mentioned earlier in this chapter. One of these indicators is public transport<sup>9</sup>. The improvement of the latter can have a substantial impact on the leisure time of individuals, which is respectively productive for one's mental health. Moreover, extending or improving public transport might affect people's access to health care, education and work, especially those facing underprivileged economic circumstances.<sup>10</sup> Besides public transport, we have added two other indicators, for these were mentioned in the NRRPs and after examining their relation with well-being, we found solid evidence for the relevance of these indicators. These are rural development and social equity.

Firstly, where rural development was mentioned, it often related to contributions centred in creating more and better life opportunities in rural areas, resulting, for example, in better job opportunities. We argue that developing rural areas is relevant for one's "success in realising central goals/values"

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<sup>8</sup>The following studies offer empirical proof for the relevance of housing conditions for one's well-being: Liddell, C. & Guiney, C. (2015, March). Living in a cold and damp home: frameworks for understanding impacts on mental well-being. *Public Health*, 129(3):191-9. doi: 10.1016/j.puhe.2014.11.007. Emmitt, S. (2022). Building health and wellbeing. *Building Research & Information*. 50:1-2, 1-5, DOI: 10.1080/09613218.2021.201527

<sup>9</sup>Prior to the determination of public transport as a category, considerations regarding employing the broader concept of mobility were made. However, the role of governments is more prominent in the expansion and betterment of public transport offers. Furthermore, not every type of mobility translates into the same constellation of benefits for the well-being of individuals, as we describe. Attending, moreover, to practical examples in relation to our research. Some investments in the German NRRP focus on inciting the population to purchase electric cars. Facilitating the acquisition of electric cars, however, may simply replace non-electric cars, rather than allowing more individuals the access to a car. It will obviously translate into gains in the field of German environmental policy, but benefits for the well-being of individuals cannot be reliably measured.

<sup>10</sup>Several sources support the relation between transport and social and individual well-being: Cooper et al. (2019). *Transport, health, and wellbeing: An evidence review for the Department for Transport*. London: NatCen Social Research. Retrieved April 10, 2022, from <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/transport-health-and-wellbeing>

Delbosco, A. (2012). The role of well-being in transport policy. *Transport Policy*, Vol-23, pp. 25-33. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tranpol.2012.06.005>

Die Bundesregierung Deutschlands (n.d.). Government Report on Wellbeing in Germany. <https://www.gut-leben-in-deutschland.de/downloads/Government-Report-on-Wellbeing-in-Germany.pdf>

Silva, P. T. (2015). *Qualidade de Vida Urbana e Mobilidade Urbana Sustentável na Cidade do Porto – Elaboração de um conjunto de indicadores*. [Master Dissertation, University of Porto]. Repositório Aberto da Universidade do Porto. <https://repositorio-aberto.up.pt/bitstream/10216/81713/2/35643.pdf>

and also for one's "personal development" (Taylor, 2018, p. 88), which classifies as reliably productive of well-being, i.e., it allows individuals to pursue their goals if wishing to remain in the countryside or if not being able to leave said rural area. The relevance of rural development actions for the promotion of well-being - namely promoting job opportunities and combatting demographic decline in rural areas - has also been demonstrated by several studies.<sup>11</sup> Lastly, we found the promotion of social equity mentioned in reforms and investments of NRRPs. Governments enact reforms or investments targeting underprivileged strata of society with the aim of tackling hurdles for several individuals, thus promoting general and individual well-being. Promoting social equity is reliably productive of well-being, as efforts towards reducing societal hurdles for the less privileged, enable individuals' "success in realising central goals/ values" and "personal development" (Taylor, 2018, p. 88). Secondly, as Böhnke and Kohler's (2008) contribution reveals,

*"[t]he quality of a society, measured as the perception of conflicts, trust in people and the evaluation of social and public services, impacts strongly on life satisfaction outcomes; this is especially obvious in the transformation countries. The political circumstances in which someone experiences a decent life or miserable living conditions matter a lot: Societal surroundings turn out to be an influential domain for individual well-being" (p. 41)*

Based on Taylor's (2018) thinking on well-being and employing OECD's Better Life Index as a fundament for a set of well-being dimensions, we developed an operational set of codes to measure the promotion of well-being in the selected NRRPs. In the next section, concerning the methodological proceedings of our research, we expound in more detail what aspects each well-being dimension encompasses.

## 4. Methodology

The present study aims at elaborating a comprehensive analysis of the NRRPs with a focus on the green transition pillar to describe the social dimension of the investments. To understand whether and how the Member States embedded social aspects either explicitly or implicitly in their respective elaborations, a qualitative approach was chosen to scan the NRRPs and thus, collect and analyse the data. As the intention of the research is to interpret the content under the pillar of green transition, i.e., to identify keywords and investigate their meaning, we opted for qualitative content analysis.

Furthermore, a multiple-case study method was employed. The latter not only generated a wealth of data but also opened up the possibility of comparison. The submission of an NRRP was a prerequisite defined by the European Commission for the EU Member States to 'register' and benefit effectively from the support. In addition, certain requirements regarding the content and targets were applied. This included – which was in line with our research interest – the agreed requirement to allocate a minimum of 37% of expenditure to climate action. As a result, climate measures in terms

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<sup>11</sup>The following studies offer empirical ground for our claim that rural development affects individuals' well-being: Die Bundesregierung Deutschlands (n.d.). Government Report on Wellbeing in Germany. <https://www.gut-leben-in-deutschland.de/downloads/Government-Report-on-Wellbeing-in-Germany.pdf>  
OECD (2020). Rural Well-being: Geography of Opportunities. *OECD Rural Studies*. Paris: OECD Publishing. <https://doi.org/10.1787/d25cef80-en>

of investments are an integral part and thus, the basis for comparison was created for our research. With 27 EU Member States, there was an extensive pool of potential case studies from which the subjects chosen for the cross-country comparison were selected.

This methodological procedure has several advantages. Not only does qualitative, case study research provide the opportunity for in-depth and extensive description and analysis of phenomena, as it is adequate in political science, but it also enables the handling of non-numerical data and generates a framework for the directed, but also flexible investigation of contemporary real-life events on the basis of primary data. Additionally, through the systematic analysis of the NRRPs of the respective Member States, the chosen methods corresponded to a suitable tool to provide this study with relevant data as the examination of the NRRPs formed the basis of the research.

#### 4.1. Sample: Selection of comparator countries

Due to the limited scope and resources of the research, a systematic selection of relevant cases had to be made. In this process, a conclusive choice was made from the existing pool of 27 EU Member States.

Four countries have been selected for the present research project:

1. Austria
2. France
3. Germany
4. Portugal

The rationale for selection depended both on the purpose and the intended use. The following strategy was pursued: We focused on selecting countries that feature maximum variation and political relevance. Moreover, we sought to take into consideration conform as well as dis-conform cases to ensure a certain degree of diversity. Further relevant points were the aspects of feasibility and convenience, i.e., the effected publication on the reporting date, since several countries did not release the NRRPs until the orientation date, which narrowed the cases to be selected. In addition, we faced a language hurdle since no translations of the plans could be provided upon request, limiting the selection to plans that could be evaluated within the limits of linguistic ability.

We thus attended to an interplay of factors, which influenced the criteria chosen for selecting the subjects. Amongst the factors are country size and location, role, and position in the EU as well as national government, and socioeconomic context.

**Austria.** An interest in analysing this small central-European country derives from its position as one of the leaders of renewable energy production – not only at the European level but also at the global level. In an EU comparison, Austria represents – beside Belgium – the country with the highest percentage of GDP being spent on national expenditure for environmental protection, with a total of 3,2% (Eurostat, 2021). Austria is a country that overachieved its 2020 target of renewable energy share with 36,5% and is thus, on sixth position in an EU comparison (Eurostat, 2020). Since 2021,

Austria has been led by three preceding governments consisting of a conservative party, the *ÖVP* and a green party, *Die Grünen*.

**France.** The country, for its part, represents one of the founding Member States as well, and it is the largest European country by area. France is the second biggest net payer of the EU budget. With regard to climate issues, France is, like Germany, a country that takes the role of a climate leader in the EU (Denisson, Loss & Söderström, 2021). France features an interesting peculiarity in this respect, i.e., it was the “de facto leader of the group of Member States that called for the inclusion of nuclear energy in the EU’s strategy for reducing carbon emissions to net-zero by 2050” (Denisson et al., 2021, p. 9) and this is also reflected in its strategy. According to President Emmanuel Macron, the new French energy strategy will be based on two pillars: renewable energies and nuclear power (Gouvernement, 2022). Another interesting factor that is particularly relevant for France is the trend surrounding extreme weather events. The country has experienced significantly higher numbers of natural disasters than other European countries over the past 60 years and has faced some of the highest economic losses because of climate-related events in that period of time (Schlechtriem, 2021; European Environment Agency, 2022).

**Germany.** The country has been selected for its prominence as a big Western European country. It represents one of the founding Member States that possesses a great relevance in the EU. Germany is not only the biggest net payer of the EU’s budget, but is, moreover, by far the biggest CO<sub>2</sub>-producing country of the EU’s Member States (Global Carbon Atlas, 2021). Concomitantly, it embodies the country with the most ambitious climate goals of the EU, as it aims for climate-neutrality by 2045 – five years earlier than the EU-wide goal (Bundesregierung, 2021). In addition, according to the Climate Change Performance Index (CCPI, 2022), Germany finds itself in one of the higher positions of the ranking of the EU27, i.e., in fifth place. Since the federal elections in September 2021, Germany has a government with a coalition of Social Democrats – *SPD*, Liberals – *FDP*, and Greens – *Die Grünen*.


Another important aspect of the latter countries is the fact that Germany and France frequently represent an important duo on European level. This was also the case this time, when both countries released their NRRPs at a joint press conference, once again underlining the bilateral cooperation and precisng that the plans were developed hand in hand (Ministère de l’Économie, des Finances et de la Relance, 2021).

**Portugal.** The country is a rather small South-European country at the periphery of the EU. It stands as an agent for the South. Portugal represents the fourth biggest beneficiary of the EU after Poland, Hungary, and Greece, when calculating the net contributions minus the money received (Buchholz, 2020). Considering the NRRP submissions, Portugal was said to be the ‘Musterschüler’, the best student, having submitted its national plan to the Commission as the very first country (European Commission, 2021). In terms of climate issues, Portugal finds itself in the upper range of the CPPI, in seventh place (CCPI, 2022). The country is ranked in the midfield with regard to its CO<sub>2</sub> emissions, in 13th place (Global Carbon Atlas, 2021). Portugal is a country that overachieved its 2020 target of

renewable energy share as well, with 34% and is thus, on seventh position in an EU comparison (Eurostat, 2020).

## 4.2. Data collection

In order to acquire relevant data to respond to the research question, we decided to draw on the NRRPs of each selected country as the only vehicle for data collection to be subjected to the content analysis. The NRRPs represent the postulated and central national elaborations anchored in the temporary recovery instrument, the RRF. As such, they embody very suitable key documents which comprise climate measures and reforms within the pillar of green transition. Including the NRRPs as data collection material provided our research with significant primary sources.



**Figure 1.** Sequencing of data collection.

The process of data collection ([Figure 1](#)) initiated with the download of the respective plans, i.e., (1) Austria: 'Österreichischer Aufbau- und Resilienzplan 2020-2026' (ÖAR); (2) France: 'Plan National de Relance et de Résilience' (PNNR); (3) Germany: 'Deutscher Aufbau- und Resilienzplan' (DARP); and (4) Portugal: 'Plano de Recuperação e Resiliência' (PRR).

In a next step, the NRRPs were subjected to a rough screening, followed by an intensive reading in their entirety to pinpoint all sections of interest. Subsequently, the components of the plans concerning the climate measures were identified, indicated, and read attentively. Correspondingly, chapters and subchapters partially addressing the reforms and investments for a green transition were scrutinised.

The gathering of the data to be analysed was ensured by systematically transferring the identified, relevant text passages into a tabular overview designed by us. For this purpose, in the first step the database was created in alignment with the plans and in the second step the data were entered accordingly.

## 4.3. Data analysis


For this study, we analysed the data collected from the NRRPs in orientation to Mayring's (2015, p. 58-60) concept of content analysis. Starting with the determination of the material to be analysed for the preceding data collection, the national plans were put into context, by conducting a short assessment of the developing situation, and were then examined along their formal characteristics, i.e., the structure and the length. Subsequently, the direction of the analysis was determined and

comprised, in accordance with the research questions, the aim of drawing conclusions on the analysis material and, if possible, highlighting effects on the target group.

This was followed by the determination of an appropriate analysis technique, i.e., structuring the content and thus, determining and defining a system of categories and variables that would generate the basis for the coding.

Depending on the approach that is followed within the content analysis, the process of the coding varies. Given the theoretical framework of the research and respective literature, a directed content analysis was conducted. Our study initiated with a comprehensive theoretical elaboration which provided us with a well-grounded source and basis of codes and keywords that were considered in the examination of the content of the NRRPs. In the course Thus, the timing of the definition of the codes and keywords was before and during the data analysis (Hsieh & Shannon, 2005, p. 1286).

As already mentioned before, the study included the creation of a comprehensive and systematic dataset in the form of a table to comprise all of our collected data, which served as the basis for our analysis and, further on, will enable the discussion of the results. The data analysis followed a process with clearly defined steps. The steps of the analysis are congruent with the columns of the table. An outline of the course of the process is illustrated in [Figure 2](#).



**Figure 2.** The data analysis – step-by-step.



## Target groups

The NRRPs comprise a number of climate measures, targeting different purposes and different sectors. As the plans were examined, it became apparent that each measure, without exception, could be assigned to a specific group. This opened up the possibility of a systematic assessment and coding of target groups to gain further insight into the questions: Which group(s) will the green transition serve? And what amount of budgetary resources will be allocated to which group(s)?

The existing target groups represent:

1. the public sector,
2. the private sector, and
3. the population as such, i.e., the citizens of the respective country.

In some fewer cases, the target groups were further specified, e.g., the type of institution in the public sector, the type of enterprise in the private sector or the type of grouping within the population. These specifications were also considered and transferred.

As for the relevance of considering the target groups, we argue that this categorisation sheds light on the direct beneficiaries of the investments and reforms. There is an assumption that if the budgetary resources are allocated to the public sector, possibly more people can benefit from the outcomes, since public services are generally available to the entire population, and or, the public sector provides relevant services for the well-being of citizens. As for allocating budgetary resources to the private sector, we cannot argue for the same, as the private sector does not necessarily attend to public interests nor reliably are their services or products available to the entire population. Lastly, if the population is the direct beneficiary, it is more probable that these investments affect the well-being of individuals, and when attributed to particular segments of the population, it is then observed whether benefiting these segments in particular combats against individual suffering and the ramifications of social inequality.

## Well-being dimensions

The well-being served as the core of our examination and thus, represented the set of categories for our coding. The first set of codes was identified and defined based on the theoretical framework, namely an approach based on well-being indicators. This set of codes was supplemented in the course of the evaluation by the codes that were identified in the review of the NRRPs.

The set of categories were scrutinised in two different ways: from the explicit and inexplicit perspective. This ensured that no information was left out, as well-being dimensions were not mandatorily specified but could be identified through our coding rules. This approach allowed us to fully extract the data, despite the fact that it could not be determined directly but could only be inferred indirectly in certain components and measures. For the explicit perspective, we considered all well-being dimensions that are directly mentioned in the plan as an impact, co-benefit or objective of the analysed measure in terms of well-being. For the inexplicit perspective, we considered all well-being dimensions that are not directly mentioned in the text but that are substantially impacting or are expected to impact the social turn-out of the measure. Moreover, the evaluation along the

explicit/inexplicit criteria enabled us to verify whether national governments of the EU Member States take on the existence of intersections between social and environmental policy, i.e., individual and collective well-being and environmental measures. Thus, the possibility arises to scrutinise the discourse strategy of the EU, which aims at ensuring that ‘no one is left behind’, and whether the Member States make use of the potential to place the people at the heart of the green transition.

Through the theoretical framework and during the evaluation of the plans the following social dimensions were defined ([Table 1](#)):

Category	Sub-category	Definition
Housing	Housing expenditure	Energy retrofitting is promoted, financially supported and implemented. With the development of hydrogen and renewable energy, i.e., less-polluting production of energy resources and reduction of energy poverty, adequate housing and its costs are made affordable. In terms of welfare, the latter is observable when the population and/or specific segments of the population represent the target group.
	Housing conditions	Renovation, restoration and energy retrofitting of buildings is promoted, and grants are made available, ensuring adequate housing conditions and tackling energy poverty, primarily through improved isolation of residential buildings or development and provision of adequate housing for specific target groups or in specific cities. In terms of welfare, the latter is observable when the population and/or specific segments of the population represent the target group.
Income and consumption	Support for green consumption <sup>12</sup>	Grants and support are provided for the purchase of environmentally friendly products and services. Institutional and financial support for green choices by individuals are encouraged, taking some financial pressure off consumers and addressing barriers to adopting climate-friendly behaviours at the individual level. Additionally, green consumption hurdles are reduced, e.g., through tax exemptions, subsidies, but also through the easing and partial abolition of bureaucratic obstacles and the improvement and acceleration of processes around green purchase decisions.

<sup>12</sup>This well-being dimension relates to OECDs sub-indicator *Household net adjusted disposable income* (OECD, n.d.c), which regards the monetary funds that a household earns each year, after taxes are deducted. We chose the denomination *Support for green consumption* to substitute this indicator, for it is more precise to describe the measures that governments propose in their NRRPs, such as grants or tax reductions favouring green choices, which ultimately can favour individuals and households net adjusted disposable income.

Jobs	New, green jobs <sup>13</sup>	New jobs in the sectors moving towards a green transition are developed and offered. The creation of jobs through the adaptation of the private and public sector to the green transition is saving businesses' money and creating additional jobs because of order increase and by opening up new work sectors.
	Working conditions <sup>14</sup>	Measures towards a green transition are executed, which concomitantly ensure a better working environment due to complementary relations between greening and well-being. Parts of the expenditure are dedicated to the improvement of working conditions and thus, the well-being of employees, i.e., investments in better safety at work, improved general conditions, the prevention of work-related hazards, thus, generating a positive impact on mental health. Additionally, jobs in polluting industries are omitted.
Education <sup>15</sup>	Formal education	Educational offers in school, vocational training and university context are designed to be broader and more diverse. If applicable, education of students and formal vocational training are related to skills needed for the green transition.
	Reskilling and upskilling	Offers for reskilling and upskilling in the working context are expanded and provided. More training for workers from polluting industries, i.e., reskilling of public workers for the green transition is offered. If applicable, training of workers is related to skills needed for the green transition.

<sup>13</sup>As it is impossible in our research to measure *Employment rate*, *Average earning* and *Job security*, as provided by the OECD Better Life framework (OECD, n.d.d), we sought for the impact of the green transition measures in these listed outcomes. Accordingly, we rationally established a connection between the creation of more workplaces with a prospective impact on the country's employment rate. Moreover, we argue that green jobs in particular are more clearly associated with sectors whose industries are more likely to secure workplaces in the long-term, than industries that will be deemed obsolete at the turn of the green transition.

<sup>14</sup>After conducting preliminary research on the impact of Working conditions for individuals' wellbeing, we found substantial empirical evidence to add this well-being dimension in our set of categories. We argue that beyond financial factors, also other factors, such as a healthy and safe work environment affect people's well-being. For empirical evidence that supports our claim, please consult:

Nappo, N. (2019). Is there an association between working conditions and health? An analysis of the Sixth European Working Conditions Survey data. *PLoS One*, 14(2), e0211294.

Cottini, E., & Lucifora, C. (2013). Mental health and working conditions in Europe. *ILR Review*, 66(4), 958–988. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/24369560>

<sup>15</sup>OECD's sub-indicators under Education concern the measurement of outcomes and do not offer a possibility for a pluralistic view on education. Accordingly, we adapt this indicator to suit our approach which cannot measure outcomes. Accordingly, we divide Education in two well-being dimensions: Formal education and Reskilling and upskilling. We consider both dimensions to be determinant in providing individuals with "the knowledge, skills and competences needed to participate effectively in society and in the economy", thus aligning with the rationale of OECD Better Life Index (OECD, n.d.e). Moreover, the Reskilling and upskilling dimension supports individuals in sustaining their workplaces. Providing reskilling and upskilling opportunities, offers workers a leverage in the context of a green transition, which potentially exacerbates their job security.

Safety <sup>16</sup>	Public safety	The safety of the population is improved and expanded in the area of risk prevention. Climate adaptation measures and risk prevention are combatting repercussions of climate change related events, which endanger the population and their properties.
Health <sup>17</sup>	Public health	Public health is improved. The latter is achieved due to the development, promotion and implementation of measures which contribute to the reduction of air and noise pollution and its production, such as waste management, traffic, etc.
	Health and social care	Access to health care and/or social care is improved and expanded. The care system is modernised through the employment of green measures, e.g., greening of the health care and/or social care management. Energy retrofitting and green construction is promoted. Additionally, support plans and investments are supporting the health sector financially.
Environment	Water protection	Water as a fundamental factor to human well-being is provided by sustainable and high qualitative means, i.e., the water quality is improved and ensured. Additionally, the sustainable resource usage is designed to be more efficient and all in all, water management is modernised and expanded.
	Air quality	Air pollution, affecting people's quality of life, is tackled in various sectors. Interventions aiming at decreasing pollutant emissions are developed to prevent further health and climate impacts.
	Food and nutrition security <sup>18</sup>	Food security is generated by investing in climate adaptation measures for the food and nutrition sector, i.e., by improving and strengthening measures to counter climate impacts in the

<sup>16</sup>In OECD Better Life Index, the indicator on safety regards solely the hazards ensuing from criminality for one's personal safety. We argue that one's safety is also put at risk by natural causes, such as natural catastrophes, floods and wildfires. Accordingly, we observe where environmental policy can play a role in ensuring the public's safety, which consequently plays a prominent role in one's personal safety, "a core element for the well-being of individuals" (OECD, n.d.f)

<sup>17</sup>The OECD Better Life Index sub-indicators, under the umbrella of health, are bound to a measurement of outcomes, such as *Life expectancy* and *Self-reported health* (OECD, n.d.g). Accordingly, these could not be employed in our analysis. Therefore, we trace good health and life expectancy to its causes, or rather the causes on which government actions and policies can have an influence: the country's health and social care systems, and the promotion of public health. We attribute to the health and social care system the importance of treating diseases and offering support for those facing diseases, and/or disabilities, thus affecting an individual's life expectancy and self-perceived health status. As for *Public health*, in the narrow sense we attribute it, comprises the potential prevention of diseases, through the mitigation of potential man-made hazardous effects for people's health.

<sup>18</sup>Under *Environment*, the OECD Better Life Index accounted for *Air pollution* and *Water quality* (OECD, n.d.h). To this list of sub-indicators, we added *Food and nutrition security*, a subject-matter deemed crucial by the OECD yet not adjoined to the other indicators, for a reason for us unknown (OECD, n.d.i). Although food security entails more aspects than environmental ones, namely, social and economic, we observe the potential of climate adaptation measures in assuring food and nutrition security in a near-future jeopardised by the consequences of climate change and a rise in extreme weather. One cannot circumvent the relevance of *Food and nutrition security* for an individual's well-being, for the latter is inextricable from an individual's access to basic resources and physical health. Notwithstanding, we advise that one consults the following studies for an in-depth look at the magnitude of this well-being dimension's influence:

		agricultural sector as well as developing and expanding the alternative food sector.
Public transportation		An equitable transportation system is provided. Expanding and improving public transportation networks and building more infrastructure reaches more population, i.e., connecting the latter with a wider range of locations and increasing the possibility of independent mobility at pace. Additionally, traffic is minimised and eased, i.e., improving the quality of living of the population, especially in urban spaces and leading to better mobility for pedestrians and improved road safety, e.g., less accidents.
Social equity		Inequalities of underprivileged and vulnerable groups of society are reduced. The special needs of certain groups of people are perceived and measures with this very focus are taken to restore the balance and prevent inequalities. This specificity of the target groups is observable and clarified in the measures.
Rural development		The urban-rural divide is tackled. A focus is put on geographically determined target groups and the specific needs of the rural parts of the countries. Measures improving the discarded situation of the latter, increasing job opportunities in rural areas and combatting demographic decline.

**Table 1.** List of well-being dimensions.

## Budget mapping

The RRF represents the key funding instrument in the NGEU package, which requires the NRRPs, and supports the EU Member States to reach their national public goals in terms of reforms and investments. It is a financial instrument, i.e., at the heart of it lies an unprecedented budget. For this reason, a financial apportionment and comparison of the plans are not only conclusive but also essential. The planned budgets are disclosed for almost all measures in the components and subcomponents.

In a first step, the total sum of the measures awarded as part of the green transition was added up to have a general overview of the costs. In a second step, the percentage of money of the internal distribution could be determined by putting the costs of the green components in relation to the national general total of the green measures. In a final step, the calculation of the costs of the individual investments to the costs of the overarching components resulted in the percentage of money from the component used for the individual investments.

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Frongillo, E. A et al. (2017). Food Insecurity Is Associated with Subjective Well-Being among Individuals from 138 Countries in the 2014 Gallup World Poll, *The Journal of Nutrition*, Volume 147, Issue 4, April 2017, Pages 680–687, <https://doi.org/10.3945/jn.116.243642>  
 Lake et al. (2012). Climate Change and Food Security: Health Impacts in Developed Countries. *Environmental Health Perspectives*, Vol. 120, N.11, pp. 1520-1526. <https://doi.org/10.1289/ehp.1104424>

We have transferred these figures in a tabular overview and placed the amounts in relation both within the plan itself and among the plans of the respective countries. This allowed us to evaluate the costs of the investments and accordingly interpret their financial weighting but also relevance.

## 5. Findings and discussion

### 5.1. Country profiles and formal characteristics of the NRRPs

#### Austria

The Austrian NRRP was submitted for approval by the Commission on April 30, 2021, the date of the deadline. It consists of a 78-page long main body with a general overview and a 605-page annex with detailed description of the investments and reforms. Thus, it is similar in size to the French one. The expenditure on the green transition measures portfolio comprises EUR 2,2 billion out of approximately EUR 3,5 billion Austrian RRF money. This implies that more than 60% of the expenditure will be used for climate transition investments. In this respect it can be noted that the alpine country has the highest share of climate investments from the EU countries we looked at. On closer examination of the different measures, it can be seen that 9 out of 16 components include investments on a green transition. Fully dedicated to climate-related investments are 9 components representing a total of 14 measures. Unlike the other three NRRP's, there are not partially dedicated to climate-related investments within the Austrian one. Austrian NRRP's efforts towards climate adaptation and mitigation are especially financially supported in the fields of climate-friendly mobility, biodiversity and circular economy, building renovation and green transition of industries.

In order to combat the consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic, a strong funding landscape has emerged in Austria over the past two years<sup>19</sup>. According to the current state of affairs, almost EUR 50 billion of national money have already been paid out/approved for this purpose. A large focus of these measures is to promote the green transition as well as digitalisation within the country's borders. The Austrian NRRP continues this logic and focuses on a portfolio of future-oriented investments. Financial resources under the RRF framework will reinforce previous national efforts in the area of climate protection. The above-average commitment to climate protection could be due to the fact that the current governing coalition aspires to become a pioneer in this area within the EU<sup>20</sup>.

#### France

The French NRRP was presented on April 27, 2021, at a joint press conference with Germany shortly before the April 30, 2021, deadline set by the Commission. It comprises the whole of 815 pages, which is rather long and represents the second largest out of those that we analysed. It can be noted that the plan states the expenditure on the green transition comprises EUR 20,744 billion out of approximately EUR 41 billion total volume. This means that 50,6% of the expenditure will be used for climate investments. Looking closer at the distribution and number of investments on the green transition, it can be seen that 8 out of 9 components tackle climate action. Fully dedicated to climate-

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<sup>19</sup>See Bundesministerium für Finanzen (n.d.) and Bundesministerium für Digitalisierung und Wirtschaftsstandort (n.d.) for details about the Austrian Corona funding landscape

<sup>20</sup>See Grüll (2020) for details on Austria's desired pioneering role in climate protection

related investments are 4 components representing a total of 24 measures. Besides, partially dedicated to climate investments are 4 components with 7 measures. As for the main parts that can be highlighted, the French NRRP's efforts towards climate adaptation and mitigation are particularly prominent and financially supported in the fields of sustainable mobility, especially in the railway sector. Equally, green energy and technologies, especially related to the hydrogen strategy, are in the centre. A high allocation of financial resources can also be found in the field of energy-efficient housing and buildings, especially the renovation of public buildings is of interest here.

To put the extensive NRRP of France in a broader context, it is important to note that the largest of EU countries in terms of surface area has an overall plan to tackle the impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic. This plan is called *France Relance*<sup>21</sup>. Already published by the French government on September 3, 2020, it is intended 'to build the France of 2030'. President Emmanuel Macron has, with that plan, committed to rebuilding a "strong, ecological, sovereign and united" economy (Gouvernement, 2022). The French NRRP is referred to in this overarching plan. The funding for all measures targeting the green transition is consequently based on the support of the budget, which is mobilised under the NRRP. Thus, around EUR 41 billion out of the EUR 100 billion comprising the France Relance plan is to be financed by the RRF.

## Germany

The German Recovery and Resilience Plan was released on April 27, 2021, at a joint conference with France. This joint publication by the two largest EU members symbolises a spirit of departure to overcome the coronavirus crisis and its consequences. It comprises the whole of 1.250 pages, which is very detailed designed and represents by far the largest out of those that we analysed. The expenditure on the green transition comprises EUR 13,912 billion out of EUR 25,619 billion RRF money. This means that 54,3% of the expenditure will be used for climate investments. When taking a closer look, it can be noted that 6 out of 10 components include investments on a green transition. Fully dedicated to climate-related investments are 3 components representing a total of 15 measures. Furthermore, partially dedicated to climate investments are 3 components with 3 measures. The German NRRP's efforts towards climate adaptation and mitigation are prominent and financially supported in the field of sustainable mobility. In particular, the conversion of the large automotive industry away from the combustion engine towards electric and hydrogen drive is in the focus. Equally, sustainable hydrogen should be made more and more marketable with some investments within the RRF framework. In addition, another great share of the RRF money is to be used for sustainable renovation and construction.

Seen in national context, the German NRRP follows its basic approach in the design of investment programs to combat the consequences of the coronavirus pandemic. The objective of bringing the economy out of the Corona recession in the short term, while at the same time initiating investments in the future and fundamental reforms in priority areas, is also enshrined in the so-called *Konjunktur- und Zukunftspaket*<sup>22</sup>. This largest and central German investment package tackling the financial

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<sup>21</sup>See Ministère de l'Europe et des Affaires étrangères (2021) for details of the *France Relance* recovery plan

<sup>22</sup>See Presse- und Informationsamt der Bundesregierung (2020) for details of the *Konjunktur- und Zukunftspaket*

impact of COVID-19 was adopted on June 3, 2020, and includes EUR 130 billion to support the German economy and equip the strongest EU-country economically speaking for tomorrow's challenges. As far as green transition is concerned, funding will be allocated in particular in the field of electromobility and green hydrogen. However, in addition to supporting selected measures of the *Konjunktur- und Zukunftspaket*, the German Government also uses the RRF money for additional measures newly designed within its NRRP.

Looking at the broad picture, it can also be said that Germany's NRRP is closely linked to its *German National Hydrogen Strategy*<sup>23</sup>. Several measures in its NRRP are intended to promote the green hydrogen market upturn, which is needed for large-scale use in economy and society. By pooling additional financial resources in the hydrogen sector, Germany will be able to advance one of its priorities in the field of green transition.

## Portugal

Portugal was the first Member State to deliver its NRRP. On April 22, 2021, the Southern European country submitted a rather detailed, 338 pages-long plan for the Commission's approval. Forming by far the shortest NRRP out of those that we have analysed, it expounds the connection between the RRP and the *Portugal's Strategy 2030*<sup>24</sup>, national and European initiatives and funds. Notwithstanding, only expenditures funded by the RRF are enlisted. Portugal's NRRP states that the expenditure on the green transition reaches a total of EUR 6,292 billion. This amount represents 37,9% of the EUR 13,9 billion in grants and EUR 2,7 billion in loans provided by the RRF. The Portuguese NRRP entails 20 components. Climate action is transversal to 16 components and comprising a total of 48 investments. Nine components are fully dedicated to the green transition, whilst seven attend to climate mitigation and adaptation only partially. The main focal points of Portugal's investments in a green transition are sustainable mobility, energy-efficient housing, energy-efficient buildings in the public and private sector and the decarbonisation of industries.

Viewed in a larger context, the Portuguese NRRP follows the content-related principles laid down in *Portugal's Strategy 2030*. The aforementioned overarching strategy sets out the guidelines for the orientation of public policies to promote the country's economic and social development in the current decade. In practical terms, the Portuguese government has presented in detail in its *Portugal Strategy 2030* how the EUR 33,6 billion allocated to the country under the MFF 2021-2027 are to be used strategically. While the initial preparation of this big strategy started long before the COVID-19 crisis, it has been adjusted to the profound consequences of the pandemic in 2020. The short-term focus is now on the stabilisation of the economy and society followed by a long-term focus on promoting recovery and resilience. A striking feature of the overarching strategic planning is that the green transition and the 'people first principle' represent two out of four thematic agendas. This is a first sign that the Portuguese government sees it as a broader green transition can only be achieved by backing it up with the social aspect. As the RRF money makes up nearly exactly 50% of the

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<sup>23</sup>See Bundesministerium für Bildung und Forschung (2022) for details of the *German National Hydrogen Strategy*

<sup>24</sup>See Deloitte (n.d.) for details of the *Portugal 2030 Strategy*



budget allocated to Portugal under the MFF 2021-2027, the coherent approach has a high potential to achieve the desired public policy goals.

In contrast to the other Member States under scrutiny in our analysis, Portugal's plan includes several investments related to marine resources, fishery and coastal infrastructures, all comprised in a component designated as "Ocean". In this component, the main efforts relate to investments in research and innovation, partnerships between universities, centres of vocational training and small, medium and large enterprises. Furthermore, these investments entail actions towards climate adaptation and preservation of biodiversity.

## 5.2. Budget mapping

As already indicated in the methodological part, a budget mapping is conducted in order to evaluate the monetary value of the green transition per se but also of the respective components and the corresponding measures. This provides a basis for a comprehensive financial evaluation and comparison of the investments. The budget mapping and thus, the interpretation of the financial weighting and relevance is carried out in this section based on the NRRPs of Austria, France, Germany, and Portugal.


The basis for the figures presented in the next step is the tabular overview, i.e., the tabular budget mapping ([Appendix B](#)). For reasons of practicability and visualisation, diagrams are used for interpretation in the following.

In principle, meaningful results can be established by listing the costs of the investments. Nevertheless, seemingly unavoidable gaps emerged in the compilation of an accurate, all-encompassing budget mapping – more precisely in 1 out of 4 of the analysed countries –, due to the fact that the Portuguese plan partly did not contain precise information on the exact redistribution of the ultimate investments of the overarching budgets for certain green components. While the Austrian, French and German plans disclose all costs, the Portuguese plan does not specify the expenses of all investments, leaving some numbers inconclusive. In this sense, it was possible to determine for all countries both the total amount of financial resources for the green transition and the percentage share of each component in relation to the overall green budget. Only for Austria, France, and Germany, the proportions of investments in relation to the sum of the respective overarching components could also be fully calculated.

### Identifiable trends in the national budgets


In its ÖAR, Austria presents the distribution of its budget: EUR 2,2 billion for investments in eight components as indicated in [Figure 3](#). With 38,5% of the total sum, 'Environmentally friendly mobility' represents the component with the highest expenditure. The measure 'Construction of new railway lines and electrification of regional railways' benefits the most of all measures in the mobility sector and accounts for 63,92% of the respective component's budget. The next largest budgets are planned for the components 'Digitalisation and greening companies' (22,91%), representing ecological investments in companies, and 'Biodiversity and circular economy' (15,91%). In the field of biodiversity and circular economy, costs are incurred primarily for the promotion of the repair of

electrical and electronic equipment (37,14%) and for investments in empty goods take-back schemes and measures to increase the reusability rate for beverage containers (31,42%). Investments in the field of renovations, which account for a share of 9,45% as well as investments for strategic innovations (5,68%), in transformations towards climate neutrality (4,55%) and resilient communities (2,27%) represent smaller shares of the budget. 0,68% of the overall budget is allocated in greening measures of the art and cultural sector.



**Figure 3.** Budget mapping of Austria's green transition.


France's PNNR displays a total budget of EUR 20,744 billion, covering investments in a total of 8 components. From the data in [Figure 4](#), it can be seen that France is planning investments in three major areas that are almost equal in cost. 31,34% of the budget is allocated to 'Green infrastructure and mobility', 27,73% is spent for 'Energy retrofitting' and 24,66% is invested in 'Green energies and technologies.' In the field of infrastructure and mobility the biggest amount of money is targeted to the implementation of a support plan for the railway sector, a measure that will make up 62,08% of the budget of the most expensive component. In the field of energy retrofitting of buildings, all sectors, i.e., private and public as well as the population, will benefit from the budget but the biggest share will be invested in the retrofitting of public buildings (66,05%). For the energy and technology sector, the money is divided rather evenly between the development of decarbonised hydrogen (37,63%), innovations towards an ecological transition (33,24%) and a support plan for the aeronautic sector (29,13%). Smaller shares are planned for 'Research, Healthcare and Dependency, Territorial Cohesion' (9,44%) and 'Environment and biodiversity' (4,12%). The smallest amounts of the budget flow into green measures of the components 'Job preservation, Youth, Disability, Vocational training' (1,45%), 'Technological sovereignty and resilience' (1,08%) and 'Digital upgrading of the state, regions and businesses, Culture' (0,18%).



**Figure 4.** Budget mapping of France's green transition.

According to Germany's DARP, a total of EUR 13,912 billion is invested in the green transition, i.e., benefiting 6 components. As [Figure 5](#) shows, there is a clear trend of investing in the field of climate-friendly mobility, which accounts for a share of 39 percent. The innovation bonus for promotion of sales of electrically powered vehicles represents the main investment in that field – it constitutes a 46,07% share of this measure. In second, third and fourth position are the decarbonisation issue, which is pursued especially through green hydrogen (23%), climate-friendly renovation and construction (19%) and the digitalisation of the economy (14%). In the decarbonisation sector, most of the budget flows into hydrogen projects under IPCEI (46,03%). Whereas CO2 building renovation through federal funding for efficient buildings and innovation promotion represent 97,01% of the renovation and construction sector and all budget of the digitalisation of the economy is dedicated to the vehicle manufacturer and supplier industry investment programme. The remaining investment accounts for a smaller share: 'Data as raw material of the future' (5%). A special feature of the German plan is the inclusion of a target, namely 'Removing barriers to investments', which does not entail any cost-related alterations (0%). The plan specifies the implementation of the objective, but no costs are indicated.

Portugal's PRR comprises a budget in the amount of EUR 6,292 billion, which enables the financing of investments of 16 components. The high number of components is also reflected in the distribution of the budget, in the sense that no key component(s) can be identified. A slight trend can nevertheless be observed in the fields of housing (19,39%) and mobility (15,3%). In the housing sector, the subordinate green measures are not listed in terms of costs, although the component takes up the proportionally largest share of the total budget. It is therefore not possible to determine which of the measures has the greatest financial weighting. In the mobility sector, the Portuguese plan is more precise: the measures that receive the largest shares of the budget are the expansion




**Figure 5.** Budget mapping of Germany's green transition

of both the Lisbon Metro Network (31,44%) and the Porto Metro Network (30,92%). All other components comprise smaller shares of the budget and are presented in [Figure 6](#).

In summary, the previous results show that most countries have major sectors that are given special attention in budgeting. It can be concluded that certain components are particularly relevant for the objectives of the countries towards a green transition and account for a large share of the costs.

Furthermore, it can be noted that the overall budgets of the countries to be financed by the RRF instrument are very unequal in size. France, for example, has the highest budget of all analysed countries with a total of EUR 20,744 billion. Germany is in second place with a total budget of EUR



**Figure 6.** Budget mapping of Portugal's green transition.

13,912 billion, which is about twice the amount of the Portuguese plan, namely EUR 6,292 billion. According to the Austrian plan, a fraction of the previous budgets is used to finance its green measures. Only EUR 2,2 billion of costs for the green transition will be incurred in Austria.

Comparing the data in the charts, it becomes apparent that there are certain similarities among the national budgets, which mainly refer to similar trends in investments. Recurring key sectors can be identified in the respective countries. The fields that feature the greatest financial weighting in the respective NRRPs are: measures in the field of environmentally friendly mobility and infrastructure, energy retrofitting and renovations investments in the housing and construction sector, and investments targeting decarbonisation.

The differences are mainly among the components, i.e., investments and reforms, which make up the smaller shares of the budget. There, country-specific measures can be observed which, for example, possess differing relevance in the various countries or require varying measures due to their geographical location, historical, political, and cultural context, or climate adaptation and mitigation objectives. For instance, Portugal defines a separate component called 'Ocean', which entails a proportionally considerable budget and which the other countries do not share, while France only mentions it in a subordinate measure. In addition, the Austrian and German plans present a great focus on industrial and business sectors, leaving out social issues, such as investments in youth, education, or healthcare etc. – measures that enjoy greater attention in the French and Portuguese plans.

The budget mapping already demonstrates initial results, albeit only preliminary indications, regarding the efforts of the respective countries to touch synergies between the social and environmental agenda in their NRRPs. These attempts can be discovered, as mentioned before, especially in the Portuguese and French plan. With regard to the planned redistribution of the budget, it can be said that the latter countries are finding opportunities to combine environmental issues with social ones and vice versa. In the plans of Germany and Austria, no complementary or real efforts to combine the fields are discernible through the budget mapping. Nevertheless, the linkage of some major sectors, such as housing, mobility, etc. with social aspects cannot be denied for all NRRPs. Especially in view of the fact that the population constitutes a large part of the beneficiaries of these objectives. However, the synergies become somewhat more concrete in the measures taken by the Portuguese and French governments. Measures in the Portuguese plan that indicate a potential interplay between environmental and social aspects are: 'National health service', 'Social answers' and 'Qualifications and competences', which accounts for 5,01%, 3,35% and 2,89% respectively of the overall budget. In France's plan, it is particularly evident through measures such as 'Research, Healthcare and Dependency, Territorial Cohesion' (9,44%) and 'Job preservation, Youth, Disability, Vocational training' (1,45%).

Given that the target group and well-being dimensions identification were a central point of analysis in the preparation of the tabular dataset, an assessment can also be made of the extent to which social goals or environmental and social synergies are addressed by the investments and thus, an approximate estimation of the level of expenditure can also be made. In the previously identified key

sectors, i.e., housing and construction, mobility and infrastructure, and decarbonisation etc., but also in all other components, we are dealing with measures that cover numerous well-being dimensions and target all target groups, i.e., the public, private sectors, and the population and if addressed, specific segments of it. A detailed analysis of the respective green components and their target groups as well as their well-being dimensions is provided in the next section.

### 5.3. Cross-country comparison

In this section, the selected NRRPs are scrutinised in a cross-country comparison. In line with our theoretical background and methodology, each NRRP was subjected to a content analysis. We commence with a scrutiny regarding the target groups of the green transition section of each country's plan. Subsequently, we introduce our results concerning the promotion of well-being relating with the countries' investments for a green transition. In order to recognise and analyse the promotion of well-being, we employ the different dimensions enumerated in our methodology. This enables a discernment not only of whether different governments aim to promote well-being, but also in which way the latter is promoted.

#### Target groups

Commencing with the target groups of the investments from each country, a contrast between the countries is brought to the surface by our analysis. [Table 2](#) illustrates the contrast between the distribution of monetary resources across target groups. Austria and Germany invest the most in the private sector. The latter is the one of the direct beneficiaries of almost all of the investments planned by the German (94,4%) and the Austrian government (78,5%). As for France and Portugal, the two countries do not target the private sector so intensely. The private sector benefits from 35,4% of the investments aiming at the green transition of Portugal, whilst in France 54,8% of the green transition focuses on the private sector. Of relevance, yet not depicted in Table 2, small and medium enterprises (SMEs) are, moreover, deliberately targeted by investments. The French NRRP presents one reform dedicated to energy retrofitting of SMEs buildings, investing a total of EUR 500 million. Also, Austria and Portugal's NRRPs introduce one investment focusing on SMEs. As for Germany, the country's NRRP dedicates, although not exclusively, six of its investments to SMEs<sup>25</sup>.

The public sector is also rather often the beneficiary of the green transition section of France's (64,5%), Austria's (57,1%) and Germany's (61,1%) NRRPs. Portugal targeted most often the public sector, dedicating to the latter 70,8%, although not exclusively, of its green transitions' investments.

	Austria	France	Germany	Portugal
Private sector	78,5%	54,8%	94,4%	35,4%
Public sector	57,1%	64,5%	61,1%	70,8%
Population	28,5%	41,9%	38,8%	22,9%

**Table 2.** Percentage of green transition investments of the NRRPs, according to target groups.

<sup>25</sup>This can be found in the tables of [Appendix C](#) of this contribution.

As for the population, it is targeted in all four NRRPs less often than the private and public sectors. 41,9% of the investments of the French green transition aim directly at the population – the highest number out of all countries. The population has been targeted by Austria in 28,5% of its investments and by Portugal and Germany, 22,9% and 38,8% respectively. Notwithstanding, the Portuguese, French and Austrian governments provide investments focusing on underprivileged strata of the population. The Portuguese plan focuses the most on underprivileged groups of the population. The Portuguese green transition counts with two investments targeting Portugal’s vulnerable population, two investments dedicated to low-income families and one investment dedicated to the low-income population. The Portuguese youth is also the direct beneficiary of one of the green transition investments and another investment is dedicated to the promotion of affordable accommodation for university students. In the French NRRP, one investment is dedicated to the low-income population and another investment centred on the reinforcement of the country’s competences to cope with the green transition, thus focusing on highschool students, vocational trainees, university students and working population. Lastly, the Austrian government provides one investment dedicated exclusively to the low-income population, with the aim of combating energy poverty, concomitantly reducing housing expenditure<sup>26</sup>.

In order to scrutinise whether investments were dedicated exclusively to one of the aforementioned target groups, we calculated the investments centred on solely one target. This scrutiny is illustrated by [Table 3](#), introducing the percentages of green transition reforms and investments of the four NRRPs that are restricted to one target group.

As observable in [Table 3](#), the Portuguese government targeted most often exclusively the population (12,5%), followed by the French government, with 9,7%. On the other hand, Germany’s plan introduces no measure focused entirely on the German population. Once more, we can discern a larger dedication from the French and Portuguese governments to their public sector, with a respective total of 29% and 37,5% of their green transition investments focusing on the countries’ public sector. As for the private sector, it is most frequently targeted by the German government, which dedicates 33,3% of its green transition measures to the private sector, whilst targeting exclusively the public sector in solely 5,6% of its green transition investments. As for Austria’s green transition so are a larger portion of its investments focused on the private sector (21,4%), in detriment of the public sector (7,1%).

	Austria	France	Germany	Portugal
Exclusively private sector	21,4%	19,4%	33,3%	16,6%
Exclusively public sector	7,1%	29%	5,6%	37,5%
Exclusively population	7,1%	9,7%	0%	12,5%

**Table 3.** Percentage of green transition investments of the NRRPs, restricted to one target group.

<sup>26</sup>This can be found in the tables of [Appendix C](#) of this contribution.

In sum, the Portuguese government demonstrates a greater effort in directly benefiting the Portuguese population, simultaneously acting against individual hurdles for less privileged strata of the society, thus combating social inequalities more consistently than the other governments, whose NRRPs were under scrutiny. Nonetheless, an effort is noted from the French and Austrian governments in counteracting class antagonisms, although not as systematically. Furthermore, the German and Austrian plans' greater dedication to the private sector ensues in a lack of transparency as to whether the people are being placed at the centre of their green transitions. Moreover, as often measures target all target groups simultaneously – namely the private sector, public sector, and population – it remains unclear to which extent each target group is profiting from the investment.

### Well-being dimensions


As for the well-being dimensions (WBD) and their connection to the green transition of the four selected NRRPs, we analysed separately the dimensions that were explicitly mentioned in the plans by the governments that devised the latter – *explicit well-being dimensions* –, and the dimensions which can be linked to the investments, yet are not mentioned, but only inferred – *implicit well-being dimensions*. When coding for implicit well-being indicators linked to measures, a relation between the latter and the indicators was established taking into consideration the prospect impact and extent of each measure. For example, a reduction of CO<sub>2</sub> emissions through the promotion of repairment of electrical and electronic equipment (repair bonus) – as it is one of the measures of the Austrian NRRP –, cannot be estimated to result in a considerable impact in the air quality in the Austrian territory, nor in the promotion of overall public health. Firstly, this measure requires an active response of the population, which cannot be measured. Secondly, it is not evident whether this measure relates with significant changes regarding air pollution in the country. For that, one would need to prove that most of the electronic equipment is being produced in the country, that a reduction of the acquisition of new electronic equipment, in detriment of repairing old electronic equipment would signify a reduction of the national production, or that the landfill sites for old electronic equipment are located in Austria and currently affecting public health. On the other hand, measures aiming at the decarbonisation of industries located in the country are unmistakably linked to a decrease of air pollution and the promotion of public health. Consequently, measures such as 'Transformation of industry towards climate neutrality' in the Austrian NRRP (Bundesministerium für Finanzen, 2021a), 'Decarbonisation of industry' in the French plan (Ministère de l'Europe et des Affaires étrangères, 2021), 'Support programme for decarbonisation in industry' in the German NRRP (Bundesministerium der Finanzen, 2021), and lastly, the 'Decarbonisation of industries' in the Portuguese NRRP (Ministério do Planeamento, 2021) can be sufficiently linked to ample improvements in *Air quality* and positive effects on *Public health*. The same goes for measures resulting in the reduction of traffic and air pollution, due to an enlargement and improvement of public transportation networks.

Firstly, we analyse explicit and implicit well-being dimensions jointly. This step of our analysis provides us with information on how social and environmental policy fields can be connected in governments' action plans, namely their NRRPs –, whether this connection is expressed or not. Figures 7 to 10 illustrate the sum of implicit and explicit well-being dimensions in the green transition



of each of the four analysed NRRPs. The percentages are related to the total of investments analysed. A scrutiny regarding the amount of monetary funds linked to each well-being dimension could not be thoroughly conducted for all four countries. Notwithstanding, when feasible, we introduce the calculations on the relation between invested monetary funds and the presence of well-being dimensions. These relations must, however, be viewed with caution, as it is not possible to track the exact amount of monetary resources employed for the promotion of each well-being dimension. Often one investment and consequently, one sum of money is linked to several well-being dimensions and most importantly, to various target groups.

Austria's green transition demonstrates potential for the promotion of well-being, mostly in relation to the creation of *New, green jobs* – connected to 78,6% of green transition measures – and *Reskilling and upskilling* opportunities for the working population of the country – also connected to 78,6% of the Austrian green transition investments. The investments connected to these two indicators – often in combination with other well-being dimensions – are rendered 90,7% of the entire green transition budget of the Austrian NRRP. Moreover, as visible in Figure 7, the improvement of *Air quality* plays a relevant role, linked to half of the investments and to 39,2% of the green transition budget. Also *Public health* is often promoted, namely in 42,9% of the investments and in connection with 41,5% of Austria's green transition budget. Attention is brought to the efforts of the Austrian green transition actions in providing *Support for green consumption* (35,7% of all investments). The latter well-being



**Figure 7.** WBD of the Austrian NRRP, in relation to the total number of investments analysed.


dimension is found in connection to measures towards green mobility and the combat of energy poverty (Ministerium für Finanzen, 2021a&b). The Austrian government, moreover, combats social inequalities rather consistently, connecting 21,4% of its green transition investments to efforts towards *Social equity*. These efforts target, although not exclusively, the low-income population in the country, through investments aiming at energy retrofitting of private households and green mobility in the public transport sector (Ministerium für Finanzen, 2021a&b). As demonstrated by [Figure 7](#), often other well-being dimensions can be linked to green transition measures of Austria's NRRPs, solely the improvement of *Working conditions* and *Health and social care* are not addressed by any of the investments.

France's green transition can be linked with all the well-being indicators employed in our analysis. As illustrated in [Figure 8](#), a particular emphasis is placed on the creation of *New, green jobs* (80,6%), improvements in *Air quality* (67,7%) and in *Public health* (64,5%). Lowering *Housing expenditure* and amelioration of *Housing conditions* are not as systematically connected with the French green transition, however, the French government employs a large sum of monetary funds in investments affecting private households. In total, 18,3% of the French green transition budget is connected to reducing *Housing expenditure* and 11,05% with the improvement of *Housing conditions*. Alone in investments towards energy retrofitting of private households, EUR 1,405 billion are invested for the general population and EUR 500 million in the redevelopment of social housing<sup>27</sup>. Relatedly, the promotion of *Social equity* is linked with 22,6% of France's green transition investments and 15,6% of the budget. Moreover, 16,1% of all analysed measures and 13,7% of the entire green transition budget comprise improvements in *Health and social care*.

Although not prominent in [Figure 8](#), for it does not connect with a large number of measures (12,9%), the improvement and expansion of *Public transportation* receives a large share of the overall expenditure. Alone one investment aiming at the increase and improvement of the railway transportation offer receives 19,5% of the green transition budget of the French NRRP (Ministère de l'Europe et des Affaires étrangères, 2021). Lastly, one can observe that all well-being dimensions are connected to France's green transition investments, even if only marginally, as it is with the dimensions of *Public safety*, *Water protection* and *Working conditions*.

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
<sup>27</sup>Consult tables of [Appendix C](#) and [Chapter 5.2](#).



**Figure 8.** WBD of the French NRRP, in relation to the total number of investments analysed.

Similarly to the Austrian NRRPs green transition, so does the German government promote well-being most significantly through efforts in creating *New, green jobs* and providing *Reskilling and upskilling* opportunities – both dimensions link to 88,9% of all investments and to 99,5% of the entire green transition budget. The German green transition, out of all four countries, focuses the most in these two well-being dimensions. In second place by a substantial stretch, as demonstrated in [Figure 9](#), the efforts towards promoting *Formal education* connects with 55,6% of all investments analysed in the German NRRP. This well-being dimension, however, is often present in relation to contributions to research and innovation initiatives which link the research capacities of higher education institutions and the private sector. Primary and secondary education are not tackled by any of the measures (Bundesministerium der Finanzen, 2021).


*Air quality*, *Social equity* and *Support for green consumption* are as well connected to a considerable amount of investments, namely 44,4% with *Air quality* and 33,3% with the other two well-being dimensions, respectively. As for the monetary amounts connected with these well-being dimensions, the values are rather impressive. Improving *Air quality* is supported by 70,1% of the budget, whilst *Social equity* and *Support for green transition* can be linked to 51,4% and 56,6% of the budget, respectively. Often, under the component of climate-friendly mobility, the dimension of *Support for green transition* are found, i.e., whilst supporting individual green choices, Germany secures concomitantly an investment in its automotive industry (Ministerium der Finanzen, 2021). The



**Figure 9.** WBD of the German NRRP, in relation to the total number of investments analysed.

greatest share of Germany's NRRP green transition expenditure, approximately 35%, is employed in the greening of its automobile industry. In this sense, the German NRRP differs from the plans of the other three selected countries, which invest mostly in public transportation, when focusing on climate-friendly mobility. Particular attention should be brought to a lack of climate adaptation measures, which respectively relates to an absence of measures relating to *Public safety*, *Food and nutrition security* and *Water protection*. Furthermore, investments in *Health and social care* are dissociated from the country's green transition measures. Furthermore, linkages between well-being dimensions and a large share of the German green transition budget emerges as a consequence from the lack of specificity concerning each measure. Each investment often targets all three major target groups, simultaneously comprising a large number of different actions in broader fields of action, such as Germany's large automotive industry and its innovative hydrogen strategy, thus producing a denser constellation of well-being dimensions in linkage with one single investment (Ministerium der Finanzen, 2021).

As [Figure 10](#) displays, Portugal's investments in the green transition are slightly more evenly aligned with several well-being dimensions, than the other plans. Such is achieved through the establishment of synergies between climate mitigation and adaptation measures, and social goals. The Portuguese




**Figure 10.** WBD of the Portuguese NRRP, in relation to the total number of investments analysed.

government rather attends to possibilities of complementarity. An example of a deliberate establishment of a synergy between social and environmental goals is the attempt to improve Portugal's healthcare responses by providing health centres with electric cars, thus supporting the provision of homecare (Ministério do Planeamento, 2021). Only the dimension on *Support for green consumption* is absent in Portugal's green transition. Notwithstanding, the Portuguese government, as the Austrian, French and German, promotes considerably the creation of *New, green jobs* – linked to 54,2% of the investments analysed and to circa 20,4% of Portugal's green transition budget<sup>28</sup>. Also, *Public health* and *Air quality* are central well-being dimensions to the Portuguese plan, as these connect to 33,3% and 29,2% of all green transition measures, respectively. *Public health* is linked to at least 39,4% of the green transition budget, while *Air quality* can be linked to 31,6% of the green transition budget. *Public safety* links with a total of 14,6% of the green transition investments in the Portuguese NRRP, whilst connecting at least with 9,8% of the total expenditure of the green transition. Most measures connected with *Public safety* comprise risk prevention and climate adaptation measures, which tackle possible health hazards for the Portuguese population. *Rural development* constitutes, moreover, a rather prominent well-being dimension, with its presence detected in 16,7% of all green transition measures. *Public transportation*, *Food and nutrition security*, *Housing conditions* and *Housing expenditure* respectively, are linked with slightly over 10% of all green transition measures. The Portuguese green transition focuses largely on the energetic efficiency of households and the expansion and improvement of public transport infrastructures. These foci, consequently, convertedly propel an overall large monetary investment in the

<sup>28</sup>Gaps in the data concerning the budget of Portugal's NRRP prevent us from providing a more exact number. This value is an approximation, only concerning the sums of money, which we are sure to be in connection with the well-being dimension. Further information on the allocation of the Portuguese budget constitutes, as well, approximations. For more details, please consult the table in [Appendix B](#).

amelioration of *Housing conditions* and *Housing expenditure* – both profiting from 24,1% of the green transition budget –, as well as a better and more equitable access to *Public transportation* – linked with 15,4% of the Portuguese green transition budget. Also the promotion of *Social equity* is often connected to Portugal’s green investments – 20,8% of all measures –, while circa 34,8% of the green transition budget can be linked to the strive for *Social equity*. The Portuguese government's combat against social inequalities is mainly present in investments towards an expansion of public transportation offers in large metropolitan areas and improvement of *Housing conditions* and reduction of *Housing expenditure* for individuals in underprivileged strata of society (Ministério do Planeamento, 2021).


As referred previously, the distinction between explicit and implicit linkages with well-being dimensions provides information as to whether the national governments deliberately and systematically link social and environmental concerns in their discourse. As the link between the two fields of concerns plays a prominent role in the discourse of European institutions, predominantly, the European Commission, it is relevant to unearth whether this reflects in the discourse of EU Member States.



**Figure 11.** Contrast between the total of WBD and the explicit ones in Austria’s NRRP.

[Figure 11](#) depicts an insufficient communication from the Austrian government in conveying the connection between climate mitigation and adaptation measures and positive ramifications for the well-being of the population. Nonetheless, the Austrian government conveys most comprehensively


the promotion of well-being when in relation to dimensions such as *Public transportation*, *Housing expenditure*, *Housing conditions*, *Support for green consumption* and *Food and nutrition security*.



**Figure 12.** Contrast between the total of WBD and the explicit ones in France's NRRP.

France's NRRP, on the other hand, demonstrates an overall comprehensive communication of the intersection between the climate and social agenda, visible in [Figure 12](#). With the exception of *Public health* improvements, contributions of the French green transition investments which advance other well-being dimensions seem to be purposely and systematically conveyed.

Germany's communication of the intersection between the promotion of well-being and climate policy demonstrates the largest deficit, in comparison to all countries under analysis in this contribution. The German NRRP conveys most clearly the advancement of a few and not so prominent well-being dimensions – *Public transportation*, *Housing expenditure* and *Housing conditions*. [Figure 13](#) illustrates the contrast between a communication deficit regarding the most salient well-being dimensions, namely *Formal education*, *New, green Jobs* and *Reskilling and upskilling* opportunities, and tangential well-being dimensions.




**Figure 13.** Contrast between the total of WBD and the explicit ones in Germany's NRRP.

As for Portugal, [Figure 14](#) demonstrates that the communication in the country's NRRP often bridges the advancement of well-being dimensions in connection to green transition investments. Expressing the connection of climate mitigation and adaptation measures with improvements in *Air quality* and *Public health* is where the Portuguese government's communication is lacking the most.

From the comparison of the four countries, it is made clear that the creation of *New, green jobs* is connected with more intense efforts from all analysed NRRPs. Moreover, improvements in *Air quality* and *Public health* were the two well-being dimensions most promoted by climate mitigation and climate adaptation measures of the four countries. This fact relates mostly to investments in the decarbonisation of industries and the promotion of climate-friendly mobility, which are provided a large chunk of the budgets. Although not as saliently, the four selected countries demonstrated a dedication to the promotion of *Social equity*, a dimension connected in all plans to at least 20% of green transition investments. Worthy of recognition are also the efforts of the French and Portuguese government in establishing distinctive relations of complementarity between social advancements and greening measures, namely in the synergy found between the promotion of *Health and social care* and their green transition goals.





**Figure 14.** Contrast between the total of WBD and the explicit ones in Portugal's NRRP.

Evidently, the overarching well-being dimensions which are most often found at the intersection of climate and social goals are *Health* and *Jobs*. Nonetheless, all countries neglected to convey the positive ramifications of an environment-health nexus, since the promotion of *Public health* was mostly implicit in all four countries' plans, as it is visible in Figures 11 to 14. We can, moreover, deduce that national government's communication on the intersection of social and environmental concerns often relates to a narrative of 'leave no one behind' which is mostly focused on a guarantee of general job security, as a greater focus is placed on the investment in green industries, thus securing *New, green jobs* and providing *Reskilling and upskilling opportunities* for the workforce – the latter was, however, more emphasised in the Austrian and German NRRPs.

## 6. Conclusion

This contribution aims at providing a substantive answer as to whether the green transition initiated by the NGEU concomitantly strives to assure that no one is left behind, by connecting climate and social goals.

At a time when climate policy is constantly and rapidly changing, both at the EU level and within the Member States, the question of whether policy is working against or for and with the people is becoming increasingly important. The fact that the global climate agenda is also continuously being adapted, reinforces the need for nation states and supranational bodies to ensure that the concerns

of the citizenry are contemplated. Considering only the European level and the *European Green Deal* as the key instrument of climate policy, it is striking that a massive interference in all our lives is unavoidable, due to the necessity of greening our European way of life. The ambitious goal of becoming the first climate-neutral continent by 2050, involves lifestyle changes for all of us, but it can only be achieved with our approval and support. In other words, there must be a policymaking that brings attention to a positive intersection of environmental and social concerns and purposefully and comprehensively seeks to establish the latter. The acceptance of transformation can only be generated if society as a whole changes and not a few are left behind. For the measurement of life quality, the GDP has proved to be unsuitable. Equally, other indicators to measure sustainable development are also not able to meet this end.

In light of the inadequacy of GDP and other indicators employed in the measurement of sustainable development and a continued debate on the necessity to establish a new set of indicators, operational and adequate for the assessment of life quality, our contribution attempts to fill this gap and bring individual well-being to the much needed green and just transition of European societies.

In an attempt to uncover the intersection of environmental and social policy, we build our theoretical framework upon Zwiedineck's thinking on social policy, the fundament to our argument on the relevance of well-being for policymaking, as we establish the inseparability between social policy's aim and individual well-being. Subsequently, we focused on a well-being approach, which cuts across different theories on the subject-matter. Emerging from the commonalities between distinct theories, a theory-neutral and pluralistic understanding of well-being, ascribing governments the role of respecting and promoting well-being (Taylor, 2018), paved ground for the possibility of establishing a set of well-being dimensions, operational in the conduction of our analysis.

In OECD Better Life Index, we found a comprehensive set of well-being indicators which align with Taylor's (2018) rationale. Consequently, the indicators of OECD were adjusted to fit our research aim and design. The modification of the OECD indicators is justified by the need to adapt the latter in order to enable an evaluation of the promotion of well-being dimensions in policymaking. Since OECD measures outcomes, by inquiring individuals, rather than potential impacts, sub-indicators were modified, however consistently based on the reasoning expressed by OECD Better Life Index, the criteria of Taylor (2018) and additional empirical evidence. Furthermore, from a preliminary reading of the NRRPs, considerations and supplemental research regarding an expansion of our set of well-being dimensions, led us to include two additional markers: *Social equity* and *Public transport*.

The conduction of a content analysis informed by a set of well-being dimensions allowed us to uncover how social issues are tackled in line with the green transition investments of the selected NRRPs. With our analysis, we demonstrated that all four Member States' plans promote well-being mostly through the creation of *New, green jobs* and improvement of *Air quality* and *Public Health*. Accordingly, it has been proved that the social agenda flanks the countries' green transition in greater connection with *Jobs* and *Health*, two overarching well-being dimensions. As the four Member-States attempt to decrease their CO<sub>2</sub> emissions, it is rather expectable that subsequent advancements in improving *Air quality* and *Public health* are concomitantly achieved. Additionally, and more

surprisingly, our analysis proved that the national governments' plans for a green transition demonstrate potential to concomitantly promote *Social equity*. Nonetheless, the four Member-States conveyed more consistently their advancements in the *Jobs* dimension. All countries did not place great emphasis in tracing the environment-health nexus in their green transition section. Furthermore, and attending to specificities, we acknowledge efforts towards the promotion of well-being, which do not result from a cause-consequent relation between advancements of the climate agenda (cause) and prospect betterment of well-being dimensions (consequence), as it is with the environment-health nexus. This demonstrates evidently a deliberate combination of environmental and social advances, i.e., the intention to achieve extra benefits for the well-being of the population, while aiming at progress in the framework of a green transition. This intention is distinctly signaled by the efforts towards more *Social equity*, investments in *Health and social care* and *Rural development*.

Conclusions deriving from our analysis have been drawn reasonably and proportionally to the breadth of our research. Whilst sampling and analysing the data collected, an ambiguity in the data, data gaps were identified, posing challenges to our research. Furthermore, the NRRPs present data in very dissimilar structures. These challenges were, however, not substantial to the point of hampering our analysis. We successfully responded to our research questions and our analysis supports the argument that it is possible to observe where social and environmental policy intersect, by focusing on a well-being approach.

Lastly, we argue that this contribution raises potential for further research. The span of our research was constrained by a limitation of capacities. Accordingly, we have chosen to focus on four countries, whilst comprehending the added interest, had we been able to scrutinise the plans of a larger number of Member States. Future research could unearth the intersection of environmental and social goals in the NRRPs of an increased number of other EU countries. Another important aspect to enable significant progress in this field of research is making further steps in establishing a set of well-being dimensions to evaluate public policy. A well-grounded theory-neutral and pluralist framework would constitute as an ideal set of tools to explore the nexus thoroughly and systematically between distinct policy fields and the respect and promotion of well-being, which has the potential of informing and shaping public policy to more efficiently contribute to better lives.

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## 8. Appendix

### A. Dataset

For reasons of practicability, the dataset table must be provided externally:  
Click [here](#) to access the dataset.

### B. Budget mapping

Country	NRRP classification						Amount of money in bn € for respective climate measure			Percentage of money	
	Original language			English translation			Total	Per component	Per investment/reform	Of climate measure in relation to general total	Per investment in relation to total of climate measure
	Level 1	Level 2	Level 3	Level 1	Level 2	Level 3					
France	Rénovation énergétique	Rénovation énergétique des logements privés	-	Energy retrofitting	Energy retrofitting of private homes	-	20,744	5,753	1,405	27,73%	24,42%
France	Rénovation énergétique	Rénovation énergétique et réhabilitation lourde des logements sociaux	-	Energy retrofitting	Energy retrofitting and redevelopment of social housing	-			0,500		8,69%
France	Rénovation énergétique	Rénovation des bâtiments publics	-	Energy retrofitting	Energy retrofitting of public buildings	-			3,800		66,05%
France	Rénovation énergétique	Rénovation énergétique des TPE/PME	-	Energy retrofitting	Energy retrofitting of SMEs	-			0,048		0,83%
France	Écologie et biodiversité	Densification et renouvellement urbain : aide à la relance de la construction durable	-	Environment and biodiversity	Urban renewal and densification: support for relaunch of sustainable construction	-		0,854	0,140		16,39%
France	Écologie et biodiversité	Densification et renouvellement urbain : fonds de recyclage des friches et du foncier artificialisé	-	Environment and biodiversity	Urban renewal and densification: recycling funds for derelict and artificial land	-			0,104		4,12%

France	Écologie et biodiversité	Biodiversité sur les territoires, prévention des risques et renforcement de la résilience	-	Environment and biodiversity	Biodiversity of territories, risk prevention and resilience reinforcement	-		0,074		8,67%
France	Écologie et biodiversité	Prévention du risque sismique dans les outre-mer	-	Environment and biodiversity	Seismic risk prevention in overseas territories	-		0,000		0,00%
France	Écologie et biodiversité	Réseaux d'eau et modernisation des stations d'assainissement y compris outre-mer	-	Environment and biodiversity	Water networks and sewage plant modernisation including overseas	-		0,000		0,00%
France	Écologie et biodiversité	Décarbonation de l'industrie	-	Environment and biodiversity	Decarbonisation of industry	-		0,120		14,05%
France	Écologie et biodiversité	Investissement dans le recyclage et le réemploi (notamment du plastique)	-	Environment and biodiversity	Investments in recycling and reuse (especially plastic)	-		0,164		19,20%
France	Écologie et biodiversité	Modernisation des centres de tri, recyclage et valorisation des déchets	-	Environment and biodiversity	Modernisation of waste sorting centres, recycling and waste valorisation	-		0,074		8,67%
France	Écologie et biodiversité	Investissements dans le secteur des protéines végétales	-	Environment and biodiversity	Investments in plant protein sector	-		0,028		3,28%
France	Écologie et biodiversité	Investissement pour le repeuplement forestier et l'adaptation au changement climatique	-	Environment and biodiversity	Investment for forest restocking and adaptation to climate change	-		0,150		17,56%
France	Infrastructures et mobilités vertes	Mise en place d'un plan de soutien au secteur ferroviaire	-	Green infrastructure and mobility	Implementation of support plan for railway sector	-		4,036		62,08%
France	Infrastructures et mobilités vertes	Aide à la demande en véhicules propres du plan automobile	-	Green infrastructure and mobility	Support for clean vehicle demand of automobile plan	-		0,990		15,23%
France	Infrastructures et mobilités vertes	Développement des mobilités du quotidien	-	Green infrastructure and mobility	Development of every-day mobility	-	6,501	0,900	31,34%	13,84%
France	Infrastructures et mobilités vertes	Accélération de travaux sur les infrastructures de transports	-	Green infrastructure and mobility	Accelerated work on transport infrastructure	-		0,190		2,92%
France	Infrastructures et mobilités vertes	Transformation énergétique du parc automobile de l'État	-	Green infrastructure and mobility	Greening of government's automobile fleet	-		0,160		2,46%

France	Infrastructures et mobilités vertes	Verdissement des ports	-	Green infrastructure and mobility	Greening of ports	-			0,175		2,69%
France	Infrastructures et mobilités vertes	Renforcement de la résilience des réseaux électriques	-	Green infrastructure and mobility	Reinforcement of resilience of electricity grid	-			0,050		0,77%
France	Énergies et technologies vertes	Développer l'hydrogène décarboné	-	Green energy and technologies	Developing decarbonised hydrogen	-			1,925		37,63%
France	Énergies et technologies vertes	Plan de soutien au secteur aéronautique	-	Green energy and technologies	Support plan for aeronautic sector	-	5,115		1,490	24,66%	29,13%
France	Énergies et technologies vertes	Innovater dans la transition écologique	-	Green energy and technologies	Innovating ecological transition	-			1,700		33,24%
France	Souveraineté technologique et résilience	Soutenir les entreprises innovantes (PIA4)	-	Technological sovereignty and resilience	Supporting innovative companies (PIA4)	-		0,225	0,225	1,08%	100,00%
France	Mise à niveau numérique de l'Etat, des territoires et des entreprises, Culture	Soutien aux filières culturelles et rénovations patrimoniales	-	Digital upgrading of the state, regions and businesses, Culture	Support for cultural fields and heritage renovations	-		0,037	0,037	0,18%	100,00%
France	Sauvegarde de l'emploi, Jeunes, Handicap, Formation professionnelle	Renforcement des moyens de France compétences	-	Job preservation, Youth, Disability, Vocational training	Strengthening the resources of France Compétences	-		0,300	0,300	1,45%	100,00%
France	Recherche, Ségur de la santé et Dépendance, Cohésion territoriale	Investissement en santé dans les territoires : modernisation et restructuration de l'offre de soins	-	Research, Healthcare and Dependency, Territorial Cohesion	Investment in health in the region: modernisation and restructuring of the healthcare system	-			1,000		51,05%
France	Recherche, Ségur de la santé et Dépendance, Cohésion territoriale	Plan massif d'aide à l'investissement immobilier dans le secteur médico-social français	-	Research, Healthcare and Dependency, Territorial Cohesion	Massive plan to support real estate investment in the French medical and social sector	-			0,600	9,44%	30,63%
France	Recherche, Ségur de la santé et Dépendance, Cohésion territoriale	Stratégie de relance de la R&D - Agence nationale de la recherche	-	Research, Healthcare and Dependency, Territorial Cohesion	Strategy to boost R&D - Agence nationale de la recherche	-			0,171		8,73%
France	Recherche, Ségur de la santé et Dépendance, Cohésion territoriale	Soutenir les écosystèmes d'enseignement, de recherche de valorisation et d'innovation	-	Research, Healthcare and Dependency, Territorial Cohesion	Supporting education, research, development and innovation ecosystems	-			0,188		9,60%
Portugal	Transição Climática	Mar	Hub azul	Climate transition	Ocean	Network of infrastructure for a blue economy	6,292	0,110	Inconclusive	1,75%	Inconclusive
Portugal	Transição Climática	Mar	Transição Verde e Digital e Segurança nas Pescas	Climate transition	Ocean	Green and digital transition and safety in fishing			Inconclusive		Inconclusive

Portugal	Transição Climática	Mar	Centro de Operações de Defesa do Atlântico e Plataforma Naval	Climate transition	Ocean	Center of defense operations of the Atlantic and naval platform			Inconclusive		Inconclusive
Portugal	Transição Climática	Mar	Desenvolvimento do "Cluster do Mar dos Açores"	Climate transition	Ocean	Development of the 'Cluster of the Azores' Ocean'			Inconclusive		Inconclusive
Portugal	Transição Climática	Descarbonização da Indústria	Descarbonização da Indústria	Climate transition	Decarbonization of Industries	Decarbonisation of Industries	0,715	0,715	11,36%	100,00%	
Portugal	Transição Climática	Bioeconomia Sustentável	Bioeconomia Sustentável	Climate transition	Sustainable Bioeconomy	Sustainable Bioeconomy Textile and Couture	0,139	Inconclusive	2,21%	Inconclusive	
Portugal	Transição Climática	Bioeconomia Sustentável	Bioeconomia Sustentável	Climate transition	Sustainable Bioeconomy	Sustainable Bioeconomy Footwear					
Portugal	Transição Climática	Bioeconomia Sustentável	Bioeconomia Sustentável	Climate transition	Sustainable Bioeconomy	Sustainable Bioeconomy Natural Resin					
Portugal	Transição Climática	Eficiência Energética em Edifícios	Edifícios residenciais	Climate transition	Energetic efficiency in Buildings	Residential buildings	0,610	0,300	9,69%	49,18%	
Portugal	Transição Climática	Eficiência Energética em Edifícios	Edifícios da Administração Pública	Climate transition	Energetic efficiency in Buildings	Central public administrative buildings					
Portugal	Transição Climática	Eficiência Energética em Edifícios	Edifícios de serviços	Climate transition	Energetic efficiency in Buildings	Service-related buildings					
Portugal	Transição Climática	Hidrogénio e Renováveis	Hidrogénio e gases renováveis	Climate transition	Hydrogen and Renewables	Hydrogen and renewable gases	0,370	0,185	5,88%	50,00%	
Portugal	Transição Climática	Hidrogénio e Renováveis	Potenciação da electricidade renovável no Arquipélago da Madeira	Climate transition	Hydrogen and Renewables	Potential of renewable electricity in the Madeira Archipelago					
Portugal	Transição Climática	Hidrogénio e Renováveis	Transição Energética nos Açores	Climate transition	Hydrogen and Renewables	Energetic Transition of the Azores					
Portugal	Transição Climática	Mobilidade Sustentável	Expansão da Rede de Metro de Lisboa - Linha Vermelha até Alcântara	Climate transition	Sustainable mobility	Expansion of the Lisbon Metro Network	0,967	0,304	15,37%	31,44%	
Portugal	Transição Climática	Mobilidade Sustentável	Expansão da Rede de Metro do Porto - Casa da Música-Santo Ovídio	Climate transition	Sustainable mobility	Expansion of the Porto Metro Network					
Portugal	Transição Climática	Mobilidade Sustentável	Metro Ligeiro de Superfície Odivelas-Loures	Climate transition	Sustainable mobility	Odivelas-Loures Surface Light Rail					
Portugal	Transição Climática	Mobilidade Sustentável	Linha BRT Boavista - Império	Climate transition	Sustainable mobility	Dedicated transport corridor Boavista - Império					

Portugal	Transição Climática	Mobilidade Sustentável	Descarbonização dos Transportes Públicos	Climate transition	Sustainable mobility	Decarbonisation of Public Transportation			0,048		4,96%
Portugal	Resiliência	Florestas	Transformação da Paisagem dos Territórios de Floresta Vulneráveis	Resilience	Forests	Transformation of the Landscapes of Territories of Vulnerable Forests			0,270		43,90%
Portugal	Resiliência	Florestas	Cadastro da Propriedade Rústica e Sistema de Monitorização da Ocupação do Solo	Resilience	Forests	Registrations of Rustic Property and Monitoring System of Soil occupation		0,615	0,086	9,77%	13,98%
Portugal	Resiliência	Florestas	Faixas de gestão de combustível - rede primária	Resilience	Forests	Fuel management bands - primary network			0,120		19,51%
Portugal	Resiliência	Florestas	Meios de prevenção e combate a incêndios rurais	Resilience	Forests	Means to prevent and combat rural fires (wildfires)			0,089		14,47%
Portugal	Resiliência	Florestas	Programa MAIS Floresta	Resilience	Forests	Program MORE Forest			0,050		8,13%
Portugal	Resiliência	Gestão Hídrica	Plano Regional de Eficiência Hídrica do Algarve	Resilience	Water management	Regional Plan of water efficiency of Algarve			Inconclusive		Inconclusive
Portugal	Resiliência	Gestão Hídrica	Aproveitamento hidráulico de fins múltiplos do Crato	Resilience	Water management	Multipurpose hydroelectric utilization of Crato			Inconclusive		Inconclusive
Portugal	Resiliência	Gestão Hídrica	Plano de eficiência e reforço hídrico dos sistemas de abastecimento e regadio da RAM	Resilience	Water management	Plan for water efficiency and reinforcement of the water supply and irrigation systems of the Autonomous Region of Madeira		0,157	Inconclusive	2,50%	Inconclusive
Portugal	Resiliência	Serviço Nacional de Saúde	Cuidados de Saúde Primários com mais respostas	Resilience	National Health Service	Primary Health Care with more answers			Inconclusive		Inconclusive
Portugal	Resiliência	Serviço Nacional de Saúde	Rede Nacional de Cuidados Continuados Integrados e Rede Nacional de Cuidados Paliativos	Resilience	National Health Service	National Network for Integrated Continued Care and National Network for Palliative Care		0,315	Inconclusive	5,01%	Inconclusive
Portugal	Resiliência	Habituação	Bolsa Nacional de Alojamento Urgente e Temporário	Resilience	Housing	National grant for urgent and temporary housing			Inconclusive		Inconclusive
Portugal	Resiliência	Habituação	Reforço da oferta de habitação apoiada na Região Autónoma da Madeira	Resilience	Housing	Reinforcement of supported housing offers in Madeira		1,220	Inconclusive	19,39%	Inconclusive
Portugal	Resiliência	Habituação	Aumentar as condições	Resilience	Housing	Increase housing conditions of			Inconclusive		Inconclusive

			habitacionais do parque habitacional da Região Autónoma dos Açores			Azores' housing stock					
Portugal	Resiliência	Habitação	Parque público de habitação a custos acessíveis	Resilience	Housing	Public affordable housing stock			Inconclusive		Inconclusive
Portugal	Resiliência	Habitação	Alojamento Estudantil a custos acessíveis	Resilience	Housing	Affordable Student Accommodation			Inconclusive		Inconclusive
Portugal	Resiliência	Respostas sociais	Nova Geração de Equipamentos e Respostas Sociais	Resilience	Social answers	New Generation of Social Equipment and Services			Inconclusive		Inconclusive
Portugal	Resiliência	Respostas sociais	Fortalecimento das Respostas Sociais na Região Autónoma da Madeira	Resilience	Social answers	Strengthening Social Responses in the Autonomous Region of Madeira	0,211		Inconclusive	3,35%	Inconclusive
Portugal	Resiliência	Cultura	Património Cultural	Resilience	Culture	Cultural Heritage	0,060	0,060		0,95%	100,00%
Portugal	Resiliência	Capitalização e Inovação Empresarial	Agendas/ Alianças mobilizadoras para a Inovação Empresarial	Resilience	Capitalisation and Business Innovation	Mobilising Agendas/ Alliances for Business Innovation			Inconclusive		Inconclusive
Portugal	Resiliência	Capitalização e Inovação Empresarial	Agendas/ Alianças Verdes para a Inovação Empresarial	Resilience	Capitalisation and Business Innovation	Green Agendas/ Alliances for Business Innovation			Inconclusive		Inconclusive
Portugal	Resiliência	Capitalização e Inovação Empresarial	Missão Interface - renovação da rede de suporte científico e tecnológico e orientação para o tecido produtivo	Resilience	Capitalisation and Business Innovation	Interface mission - renewal of the scientific and technological support network and orientation towards the productive fabric			Inconclusive		Inconclusive
Portugal	Resiliência	Capitalização e Inovação Empresarial	Agenda de investigação e inovação para a sustentabilidade da agricultura, alimentação e agroindústria [Agenda de Inovação para a Agricultura 20 30]	Resilience	Capitalisation and Business Innovation	Research and innovation agenda for sustainable agriculture, food and agro-industry [Innovation Agenda for Agriculture 20 30].	0,521		Inconclusive	8,28%	Inconclusive
Portugal	Resiliência	Capitalização e Inovação Empresarial	Relançamento Económico da Agricultura Açoriana	Resilience	Capitalisation and Business Innovation	Economic Recovery of Agriculture in the Azores			Inconclusive		Inconclusive
Portugal	Resiliência	Capitalização e Inovação Empresarial	Capitalização de empresas e resiliência financeira/ Banco	Resilience	Capitalisation and Business Innovation	Corporate capitalisation and financial resilience/ Banco Português de Fomento			Inconclusive		Inconclusive

			Português de Fomento									
<b>Portugal</b>	Resiliência	Qualificações e Competências	Modernização da oferta e dos estabelecimentos de ensino e da formação profissional	Resilience	Qualifications and Competences	Modernisation of vocational education and training supply and establishments		0,182	Inconclusive	2,89%	Inconclusive	
<b>Portugal</b>	Resiliência	Qualificações e Competências	-	Resilience	Qualifications and Competences	-		Inconclusive			Inconclusive	
<b>Portugal</b>	Resiliência	Infraestruturas	Áreas de Acolhimento Empresarial (AAE)	Resilience	Infrastructures	Business Accommodation Areas (EAA)		0,091	Inconclusive	1,45%	Inconclusive	
<b>Portugal</b>	Resiliência	Infraestruturas	Missing links e Aumento de capacidade da Rede	Resilience	Infrastructures	Missing links and increasing network capacity			Inconclusive		Inconclusive	
<b>Portugal</b>	Transição digital	Administração Pública – Capacitação, Digitalização e Interoperabilidade e Cibersegurança	-	Digital transition	Public Administration - Capacity Building, Digitalisation and Interoperability and Cybersecurity	-		0,009	0,009	0,14%	100,00%	
<b>Germany</b>	Strategie der Klimapolitik und Energiewende	Dekarbonisierung insb. durch erneuerbaren Wasserstoff	Wasserstoffprojekte im Rahmen von IPCEI	Climate policy and energy transition	Decarbonisation especially through green hydrogen	Hydrogen projects under IPCEI		13,912	1,500		46,03%	
<b>Germany</b>	Strategie der Klimapolitik und Energiewende	Dekarbonisierung insb. durch erneuerbaren Wasserstoff	Förderprogramm Dekarbonisierung in der Industrie	Climate policy and energy transition	Decarbonisation especially through green hydrogen	Support programme for decarbonisation in industry			0,449		13,78%	
<b>Germany</b>	Strategie der Klimapolitik und Energiewende	Dekarbonisierung insb. durch erneuerbaren Wasserstoff	Pilotprogramm Klimaschutzverträge nach Prinzip Carbon Contracts for Difference	Climate policy and energy transition	Decarbonisation especially through green hydrogen	Pilot project for climate protection contracts based on Carbon Contracts for Difference principle			0,550	23,43%	16,88%	
<b>Germany</b>	Strategie der Klimapolitik und Energiewende	Dekarbonisierung insb. durch erneuerbaren Wasserstoff	Projektbezogene Forschung (Klimaschutzforschung)	Climate policy and energy transition	Decarbonisation especially through green hydrogen	Project-related research (climate protection research)			0,060		1,84%	
<b>Germany</b>	Strategie der Klimapolitik und Energiewende	Dekarbonisierung insb. durch erneuerbaren Wasserstoff	Leitprojekte zu Forschung und Innovation im Kontext der Nationalen Wasserstoffstrategie	Climate policy and energy transition	Decarbonisation especially through green hydrogen	Lead projects on research and innovation in context of the national hydrogen strategy			0,700		21,48%	
<b>Germany</b>	Strategie der Klimapolitik und Energiewende	Klimafreundliche Mobilität	Zuschüsse zur Errichtung von Tank- und Ladeinfrastruktur	Climate policy and energy transition	Climate-friendly mobility	Grants for installation of fuel and charging infrastructure			5,427	0,700	39,01%	12,90%

Germany	Strategie der Klimapolitik und Energiewende	Klimafreundliche Mobilität	Förderrichtlinie Elektromobilität	Climate policy and energy transition	Climate-friendly mobility	Funding regulation for electric mobility			0,075		1,38%
Germany	Strategie der Klimapolitik und Energiewende	Klimafreundliche Mobilität	Innovationsprämie zur Förderung des Absatzes von elektrisch betriebenen Fahrzeugen	Climate policy and energy transition	Climate-friendly mobility	Innovation bonus for promotion of sales of electrically powered vehicles			2,500		46,07%
Germany	Strategie der Klimapolitik und Energiewende	Klimafreundliche Mobilität	Verlängerung des Erstzulassungszeitraumes für die Gewährung der zehnjährigen Steuerbefreiung reiner Elektrofahrzeuge	Climate policy and energy transition	Climate-friendly mobility	Extension of the initial registration period for granting the ten-year tax exemption for all-electric vehicles			0,295		5,44%
Germany	Strategie der Klimapolitik und Energiewende	Klimafreundliche Mobilität	Förderung des Ankaufs von Bussen mit alternativen Antrieben	Climate policy and energy transition	Climate-friendly mobility	Promoting the purchase of buses with alternative power systems			1,085		19,99%
Germany	Strategie der Klimapolitik und Energiewende	Klimafreundliche Mobilität	Zuschüsse zur Förderung alternativer Antriebe im Schienenverkehr (Teil der NWS)	Climate policy and energy transition	Climate-friendly mobility	Grants for the promotion of alternative drives in rail transport			0,227		4,18%
Germany	Strategie der Klimapolitik und Energiewende	Klimafreundliche Mobilität	Förderung der Fahrzeug- und Zuliefererindustrie für Wasserstoff- und Brennstoffzellenanwendungen im Verkehr	Climate policy and energy transition	Climate-friendly mobility	Promotion of the vehicle and supplier industry for hydrogen and fuel cell applications in transport			0,545		10,04%
Germany	Strategie der Klimapolitik und Energiewende	Klimafreundliches Sanieren und Bauen	Weiterentwicklung des klimafreundlichen Bauens mit Holz	Climate policy and energy transition	Climate-friendly renovation and construction	Further development of climate-friendly construction with wood			0,020		0,78%
Germany	Strategie der Klimapolitik und Energiewende	Klimafreundliches Sanieren und Bauen	Kommunale Reallabore der Energiewende	Climate policy and energy transition	Climate-friendly renovation and construction	Municipal laboratories of reality of energy transition	2,577		0,057	18,52%	2,21%
Germany	Strategie der Klimapolitik und Energiewende	Klimafreundliches Sanieren und Bauen	CO2-Gebäudesanierung: Bundesförderung effiziente Gebäude - Innovationsförderung	Climate policy and energy transition	Climate-friendly renovation and construction	CO2 building renovation: Federal funding for efficient buildings - innovation promotion			2,500		97,01%
Germany	Digitalisierung der Wirtschaft und Infrastruktur	Daten als Rohstoff der Zukunft	IPCEI Nächste Generation von Cloud-Infrastruktur	Digitalisation of the economy and infrastructure	Data as raw material of the future	IPCEI Next Generation Cloud Infrastructure and		0,750	0,750	5,39%	100,00%



			und -Services (IPCEI-CIS)			Services (IPCEI-CIS)					
<b>Germany</b>	Digitalisierung der Wirtschaft und Infrastruktur	Digitalisierung der Wirtschaft	Investitionsprogramm Fahrzeughersteller/ Zulieferindustrie	Digitalisation of the economy and infrastructure	Digitalisation of the economy	Vehicle manufacturer/supplier industry investment programme		1,899	1,899	13,65%	100,00%
<b>Germany</b>	Moderne öffentliche Verwaltung und Abbau von Investitionshemmnissen	Abbau von Investitionshemmnissen	Gemeinsames Programm von Bund und Ländern für eine leistungsstarke, bürger- und unternehmensfreundliche Verwaltung	Modern public administration and removal of barriers to investment	Removing barriers to investment	Joint programme of the federal and state governments for a high-performing, citizen- and business-friendly administration		0,000	0,000	0	0
<b>Austria</b>	Nachhaltiger Aufbau	Sanierungsoffensive	Förderung des Austauschs von Öl- und Gasheizungen	Sustainable transformation	Renovation offensive	Promotion of the exchange of oil and gas heating systems	2,200	0,208	0,158	9,45%	75,96%
<b>Austria</b>	Nachhaltiger Aufbau	Sanierungsoffensive	Bekämpfung von Energiearmut	Sustainable transformation	Renovation offensive	Combating energy poverty			0,050		24,04%
<b>Austria</b>	Nachhaltiger Aufbau	Umweltfreundliche Mobilität	Förderung emissionsfreier Busse und Infrastruktur	Sustainable transformation	Environmentally-friendly mobility	Promotion of emission-free buses and infrastructure		0,848	0,256	38,55%	30,19%
<b>Austria</b>	Nachhaltiger Aufbau	Umweltfreundliche Mobilität	Förderung emissionsfreier Nutzfahrzeuge und Infrastruktur	Sustainable transformation	Environmentally-friendly mobility	Promotion of emission-free commercial vehicles and infrastructure			0,050		5,90%
<b>Austria</b>	Nachhaltiger Aufbau	Umweltfreundliche Mobilität	Errichtung neuer Bahnstrecken und Elektrifizierung von Regionalbahnen	Sustainable transformation	Environmentally-friendly mobility	Construction of new railway lines and electrification of regional railways		0,542	63,92%		
<b>Austria</b>	Nachhaltiger Aufbau	Biodiversität und Kreislaufwirtschaft	Biodiversitätsfonds	Sustainable transformation	Biodiversity and circular economy	Biodiversity Fund		0,050	14,29%		
<b>Austria</b>	Nachhaltiger Aufbau	Biodiversität und Kreislaufwirtschaft	Investitionen in Leergutrücknahmesysteme und Maßnahmen zur Steigerung der Mehrwegquote für Getränkegebinde	Sustainable transformation	Biodiversity and circular economy	Investments in empty goods take-back schemes and measures to increase in the reusability rate for beverage containers		0,350	0,110	15,91%	31,43%
<b>Austria</b>	Nachhaltiger Aufbau	Biodiversität und Kreislaufwirtschaft	Errichtung und Nachrüstung von Sortieranlagen	Sustainable transformation	Biodiversity and circular economy	Construction and retrofitting of sorting plants			0,060		17,14%
<b>Austria</b>	Nachhaltiger Aufbau	Biodiversität und Kreislaufwirtschaft	Förderung der Reparatur von elektrischen und elektronischen Geräten (Reparaturbonus)	Sustainable transformation	Biodiversity and circular economy	Promotion of the repair of electrical and electronic equipment (repair bonus)		0,130	37,14%		

<b>Austria</b>	Nachhaltiger Aufbau	Transformation zur Klimaneutralität	Transformation der Industrie zur Klimaneutralität	Sustainable transformation	Transformation towards climate neutrality	Transformation of industry towards climate neutrality		0,100	0,100	4,55%	100,00%
<b>Austria</b>	Wissensbasierter Aufbau	Strategische Innovation	IPCEI Wasserstoff	Knowledge-based transformation	Strategic Innovation	IPCEI hydrogen		0,125	0,125	5,68%	100,00%
<b>Austria</b>	Digitaler Aufbau	Digitalisierung und Ökologisierung der Unternehmen	Ökologische Investitionen in Unternehmen	Digital transformation	Digitalisation and greening companies	Ecological investments in companies		0,504	0,504	22,91%	100,00%
<b>Austria</b>	Gerechter Aufbau	Resiliente Gemeinden	Klimafitte Ortskerne	Equitable transformation	Resilient communities	Climate-proof town centres		0,050	0,050	2,27%	100,00%
<b>Austria</b>	Gerechter Aufbau	Kunst & Kultur	Investitionsfonds „Klimafitte Kulturbetriebe“	Equitable transformation	Art & Culture	Investment Fund “Climate-friendly Cultural Enterprises”		0,015	0,015	0,68%	100,00%

### C. Tables of well-being dimensions: explicit and implicit

EXPLICIT*	Austria	France	Germany	Portugal
Housing expenditure	21,4%	16,1%	11,1%	6,3%
Housing conditions	21,4%	12,9%	11,1%	4,2%
Support for green consumption	35,7%	6,5%	33,3%	0,0%
New, green jobs	42,9%	64,5%	22,2%	39,6%
Working conditions	0,0%	3,2%	0,0%	4,2%
Formal education	7,1%	9,7%	22,2%	2,1%
Reskilling and upskilling	42,9%	6,5%	22,2%	8,3%
Public safety	14,3%	3,2%	0,0%	10,4%
Public health	0,0%	0,0%	0,0%	2,1%
Health and social care	0,0%	6,5%	0,0%	8,3%
Water protection	7,1%	3,2%	28,6%	6,3%
Air quality	28,57%	51,6%	22,2%	14,6%
Food and nutrition security	7,1%	3,2%	0,0%	6,3%
Public transportation	14,3%	12,9%	5,6%	10,4%
Social equity	7,1%	12,9%	0,0%	16,7%
Rural development	7,1%	3,2%	0,0%	14,6%

\*Percentages are in relation to the total of investments analysed.

<b>IMPLICIT*</b>	<b>Austria</b>	<b>France</b>	<b>Germany</b>	<b>Portugal</b>
Housing expenditure	0,0%	0,0%	0,0%	6,8%
Housing conditions	0,0%	2,6%	0,0%	6,8%
Support for green consumption	0,0%	2,6%	0,0%	0,0%
New, green jobs	35,7%	13,2%	27,3%	22,7%
Working conditions	0,0%	0,0%	2,3%	0,0%
Formal education	7,1%	0,0%	13,6%	0,0%
Reskilling and upskilling	35,7%	0,0%	27,3%	0,0%
Public safety	0,0%	0,0%	0,0%	4,5%
Public health	42,9%	52,6%	11,4%	38,6%
Health and social care	0,0%	7,9%	0,0%	0,0%
Water protection	0,0%	0,0%	0,0%	0,0%
Air quality	21,4%	13,2%	9,1%	15,9%
Food and nutrition security	0,0%	2,6%	0,0%	4,5%
Public transportation	0,0%	0,0%	0,0%	0,0%
Social equity	14,3%	5,3%	13,6%	0,0%
Rural development	7,1%	0,0%	6,8%	0,0%

\*Percentages are in relation to the total of investments analysed.

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This term paper was not previously presented to another examination board and has not been published.

Magdeburg, 09.05.2022

Ana Carneiro

.....  
Ana Lopes Carneiro

Florian Adam

.....  
Florian Adam



.....  
Sarah Schmitt